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HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE SCHOOL FINANCE 
CASES? 
ETHAN HUTT,* DANIEL KLASIK,** & AARON TANG*** 
ABSTRACT 
There is an old riddle that asks, what do constitutional school funding 
lawsuits and birds have in common?  
The answer: every state has its own. Yet while almost every state has 
experienced hotly-contested school funding litigation, the results of these 
suits have been nearly impossible to predict. Scholars and advocates have 
struggled for decades to explain why some state courts rule for plaintiff 
school children—often resulting in billions of dollars in additional school 
spending—while others do not.  
If there is rough agreement on anything, it is that “the law” is not the 
answer: variation in the strength of state constitutional education clauses 
is uncorrelated with the odds of plaintiff success. Just what factors do 
explain different outcomes, though, is anybody’s guess. One researcher 
captured the academy’s state of frustration aptly when she suggested that 
whether a state’s school funding system will be invalidated “depends almost 
solely on the whimsy of the state supreme court justices themselves.”1 
In this Article, we analyze an original data set of 313 state-level school 
funding decisions using multiple regression models. Our findings confirm 
that the relative strength of a state’s constitutional text regarding education 
has no bearing on school funding lawsuit outcomes.  
But we also reject the judicial whimsy hypothesis. Several variables—
including the health of the national economy (as measured by GDP growth), 
Republican control over the state legislature, and an appointment-based 
mechanism of judicial selection—are significantly and positively correlated 
with the odds of a school funding system being declared unconstitutional. 
After presenting these findings, the Article discusses the important 
 
* Assistant Professor of Education Policy, University of Maryland-College Park; Ph.D., 
Stanford (2013); M.A., Stanford (2009); Yale College (2005). 
** Assistant Professor of Higher Education Administration, George Washington University; 
Ph.D., Stanford (2013); M.A., Stanford (2010); Williams College (2003). 
*** Acting Professor of Law, University of California-Davis School of Law; J.D., Stanford Law 
School (2011); B.A., Yale College (2005). The authors would like to thank Chris Elmendorf, Bill Koski, 
and Joshua Weishart for thoughtful feedback and guidance. We also express our gratitude to our 
outstanding research assistants, Dana Sever Scott and Narasimhan Raghunathan. 
1. Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts 
Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1178 (2000). 












implications for school finance advocates and for constitutional and legal 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose parents of school-aged children file separate lawsuits in two 
different states, Oregon and South Carolina. The suits contain the same 
basic allegations. Average per-pupil spending is below the national 
average. Funding is distributed in a way that affords children in poorer 
school districts inferior access to critical resources like quality teachers. As 
a result, these children enjoy lower levels of educational attainment. Each 
lawsuit therefore seeks a declaration that the school funding system violates 
the state’s constitution.  
Oregon’s constitution declares that “the legislature shall appropriate a 
sum of money sufficient to ensure that the state’s system of public education 
meets quality goals established by law.” Oregon concedes that its 
legislature underfunds the state’s public education system by nearly $1 
billion each year. 
By contrast, South Carolina’s constitution provides merely that “the 
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free 
public schools open to all children in the state.” Although South Carolina’s 
schools are underfunded at levels similar to Oregon’s, it is undisputed that 
South Carolina’s schools are free and open to all children. 












Assume now, as actually happened, that the plaintiff parents prevail in 
one of these school funding lawsuits but not the other. What do you think 
best explains the divergent outcomes?  
We suspect most people would offer the following (perhaps obvious) 
answer: the law! More precisely, one might respond that the outcome of 
each lawsuit was determined by the relevant state constitutional provision 
as applied to the facts in each case. And because the facts are largely the 
same, the only difference that could explain the opposing outcomes is the 
constitutional text. So whereas Oregon’s education clause clearly entitles 
the plaintiffs to relief, South Carolina’s education clause does not. 
This is a neat and intellectually coherent answer to give. But it is also 
wrong. The plaintiffs in Oregon lost,2 despite the state conceding that it had 
failed to provide a “sum of money sufficient to ensure that the state’s system 
of public education meets quality goals established by law.”3 The plaintiff 
children in South Carolina won,4 even though the state argued with some 
force that the duty to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system 
of free public schools” gives rise to no clear qualitative standard for how 
much funding is necessary.5 
Counterintuitive outcomes like these are common in school funding 
lawsuits, and the academy has struggled for years to explain them.6 The only 
conclusion on which there is some consensus is that the most intuitive 
explanation is incorrect: when it comes to deciding the fate of school 
funding lawsuits, the bare meaning of the law has little do with it.7   
But if not the law, then what? Surely something explains why judges rule 
for some plaintiffs who demand billions of dollars in additional public 
 
2. Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d 133 (Or. 2009) (en banc). 
3. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. 
4. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). 
5. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
6. See, e.g., William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy 
Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1081–82 (2004) (arguing that “little is known about why 
state supreme courts choose to intervene in educational finance policy in the first instance,” and 
concluding that judicial attitude was an important variable in explaining divergent outcomes in Ohio and 
Wisconsin); Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. 
REV. 1101, 1145–46 (2000) (performing regression analysis of forty-one state court decisions and 
identifying four significant variables, two of which had the opposite of predicted relationships); 
Swenson, supra note 1, at 1178 (conceding that “[t]he proffered model of judicial decision-making in 
school finance cases has not performed well”). 
7. See, e.g., Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 241, 293 n.137 (G. Alan Tarr & 
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (“[D]isembodied parsing of constitutional terminology may be of limited 
or no value.”); William E. Thro, Commentary, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in 
School Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 22 (1993) (recognizing that “the distinctions between 













education expenditures,8 but not for others.9 The scholarship to date, 
however, has failed to identify a convincing explanation.10 
In this Article, we draw on an original data set to present evidence of 
variables that help to explain the outcomes of school finance lawsuits. First, 
to borrow from the leading explanation of Bill Clinton’s successful 
presidential bid in 1992: “It’s the economy, stupid.”11 Our analysis thus 
finds that for each 1 percent increase in national GDP growth as measured 
from the year preceding a court’s decision, a judge is 6 percent more likely 
to rule for school finance plaintiffs.12 When economic conditions are strong 
and state coffers are flush with cash, in other words, judges are more likely 
to side with plaintiffs and issue orders calling for the legislature to increase 
school spending. When the economy is sputtering and state governments 
face steep deficits, judges are far less likely to impose new spending 
mandates.   
Indeed, attention to prevailing economic conditions helps to provide the 
simplest explanation for the seemingly irreconcilable Oregon and South 
Carolina decisions. The Oregon Supreme Court heard oral argument in 
Pendleton School District 16R v. State on October 8, 200813—just three 
weeks after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and nine days after the 
stock market crashed.14 Shortly after the argument, the November 2008 jobs 
report revealed a loss of 533,000 jobs—the single largest monthly job loss 
total in more than thirty years.15 Then, in December 2008, while the case 
was still pending, the National Bureau of Economic Research officially 
declared that the U.S. economy was in a recession.16 Oregon’s Supreme 
Court Justices could not have been blind to this dire economic downturn—
 
8. See Sharon Otterman, Last Days, Perhaps, for Group That Sued for Poor School Districts, 
N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (June 8, 2011, 5:03 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/last-
days-perhaps-for-group-that-sued-for-poor-school-districts/ [https://perma.cc/84RK-JLLU] (noting that 
the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation in New York produced “billions of additional dollars” for poor 
school districts in the state). 
9. Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888 (Ct. App. 2016). 
10. See infra Part I. 
11. See Anonymous, It’s the Economy, Stupid, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://harvardp 
olitics.com/united-states/its-the-economy-stupid/ [https://perma.cc/BB99-UHMZ]. 
12. See infra Parts IV & V.A. 
13. 200 P.3d 133 (Or. 2009) (en banc). 
14. See Kimberly Amadeo, Stock Market Crash of 2008, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com 
/stock-market-crash-of-2008-3305535 [https://perma.cc/A7CJ-ED29] (last updated Aug. 22, 2019). 
15. David Goldman, Lost: 1.9 Million Jobs, CNN: MONEY (Dec. 5, 2008, 5:02 PM), https://mone 
y.cnn.com/2008/12/05/news/economy/jobs_november/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Y37Y-8VRV]. 
16. Chris Isidore, It’s Official: Recession Since Dec. ’07, CNN: MONEY (Dec. 1, 2008, 5:40 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession/ [https://perma.cc/W4N4-DFNG]. 












a downturn that inevitably affected the state’s fiscal health17 and thus its 
ability to actually satisfy any adverse judgment—when they elected not to 
issue a liability order in the Pendleton case. By contrast, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s seminal Abbeville decision was issued in 1999.18 The 
economy was humming along quite nicely, growing at a 6.3 percent clip 
from the previous year—a far cry from the 2.1 percent decrease in national 
GDP that took place in the year before Oregon’s Pendleton ruling.19 
The second significant variable we find is control over the state 
legislature. When Republicans are in control of the state legislature, judges 
are more likely to rule in favor of school finance plaintiffs than when the 
legislature is controlled by Democrats.20 This result may be surprising at 
first blush, because one might expect judges to be more willing to impose 
additional school spending mandates on legislatures that are more likely to 
comply with them. And Democrats are often thought to be more amenable 
to raising school spending (and the taxes that go along with it).21  
The data would seem to tell a different story, one of calculated judicial 
intervention. On this account, judges may be more willing to declare school 
funding systems unconstitutional when Republicans are in control because 
they perceive a heightened need to prod lawmakers into action.22 Insofar as 
Republican control reduces the likelihood of a legislature-driven increase in 
school spending, in other words, courts feel a greater need to grab the 
steering wheel themselves. By contrast, when Democrats are in control, 
courts may prefer not to intervene (a move that carries potentially great costs 
for their own institutional legitimacy)23 because there is a greater chance the 
legislature will choose to ramp up financial support for public education on 
 
17. Mike Rogoway, Oregon’s Economy Soars Yet State Budget Gap Grows: Here’s Why, 
OREGONIAN (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2017/04/oregons_economy_soars_y 
et_stat.html [https://perma.cc/QP3D-4F6K] (noting that “the general fund plunged by nearly 20 percent” 
during the great recession). 
18. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). 
19. All GDP data is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Interactive Data 
Application, online at https://www.bea.gov/itable/.  
20. See infra Parts IV & V.A. 
21. Michael B. Henderson, How Far Apart Are Democrats and Republicans on School Reform?, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/20 
15/08/03/how-far-apart-are-democrats-and-republicans-on-school-reform/ [https://perma.cc/258T-GA4 
W] (“Nearly three-fourths of Democrats favor more spending on public schools, and 54 percent of 
Republicans oppose it.”). 
22. See generally MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS (2009) (arguing that courts should view their constitutional role as 
starting up an active “colloquy” with the political branches regarding school finance). 
23. See, e.g., Koski, supra note 6, at 1102 (“Courts are aware of th[e] potential loss of legitimacy 
and the risk of entering the morass of educational finance policy before rendering their first decisions in 













its own.24 Yet again, Oregon and South Carolina are consistent with this 
story. At the time of the relevant decisions, Oregon’s legislature was 
controlled by Democrats, while South Carolina’s was not.25 
This paper proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the academy’s existing 
limited knowledge regarding the determinants of school finance litigation 
outcomes. Although a handful of law review and social science articles have 
performed statistical analyses to identify explanatory variables in school 
funding cases, the results of those studies are inconclusive at best.26 This 
paper aims to improve on this general state of fog. 
One major reason for our lack of understanding thus far is the unusually 
limited data set that the leading scholarly accounts have relied upon: the 
single most recent school finance decision from forty state courts of last 
resort.27 In Part II, we explain how we are able to create a far larger data set 
encompassing more than three hundred state court decisions. Some of this 
is a function of time; the primary accounts in the literature are now nearly 
two decades old, and a great many school finance lawsuits have been 
brought and decided since then.28 But there is another explanation. The 
earlier analyses were unduly self-limiting. State courts of last resort are not 
the only ones to decide school finance lawsuits; trial courts and intermediate 
courts of appeal do, too. Because school finance cases typically turn on 
questions of law, appellate courts approach lower court rulings on a de novo 
standard of review.29 That means each level of court reaches a legal 
judgment that is independent of the one preceding it—a fact that allows us 
to expand the relevant data set quite significantly.30 
 
24. See infra Parts IV & V.A. 
25. See State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/resea 
rch/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/TW5S-WR7U]. 
26. See infra Part I. 
27. See, e.g., Swenson, supra note 1 (relying on data set of forty state supreme court decisions); 
Lundberg, supra note 6 (data set of forty-one decisions). 
28. Both the Swenson and Lundberg articles were published in 2000. Swenson, supra note 1; 
Lundberg, supra note 6. Of course, even when the initial analyses were run, many states had multiple 
rounds of litigation that prior authors chose to neglect. We explain below why we include these 
additional rounds of state court litigation. See infra Parts I.B & II.  
29. See, e.g., Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1137–38 (Colo. 2013) (en banc) (“This case 
requires us to interpret relevant portions of the Colorado Constitution, assess the trial court's application 
of the rational basis test . . . and review the trial court's legal conclusion that the state public school 
financing system is unconstitutional. We review these questions of law de novo.”); Vincent v. Voight, 
614 N.W.2d 388, 402 (Wis. 2000) (“We interpret constitutional provisions de novo.”); Campaign for 
Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 893 (Ct. App.) (applying de novo review to trial court’s 
ruling on motion to dismiss). 
30. We are further able to expand the universe of relevant data points by considering subsequent 
state court decisions considering different legal issues. After all, it is a common observation that state-
level school finance cases have proceeded in distinct waves raising different legal theories, such that 
each new round of cases will in theory raise an independent data point for analysis. See William S. 
 












Part III explains our methodology, and Part IV presents our results. As 
previewed above, our major findings include two variables with significant 
relationships to plaintiff victories in school finance decisions: national 
economic health as indicated by GDP growth from the year preceding a 
court’s decision, and whether the state legislature was controlled by 
Republicans. In addition, we find a significant positive relationship between 
judicial elections and state defendant victories: state courts on which judges 
face reelection pressures are more likely to uphold school funding systems 
against constitutional challenge—a sign that elected judges are sensitive to 
the remedial (e.g., tax) consequences of costly liability orders.31 Our 
analysis also finds no meaningful relationship between litigation outcomes 
and several other variables often discussed in the literature, including the 
“key facts” of the case (e.g., levels of educational spending inequity) and 
the relative “strength” of a state constitution’s education clause.32   
Finally, Part V considers the implications of our findings for the school 
funding advocacy community as well as for legal theory more broadly. The 
primary lesson for school finance plaintiffs is straightforward, albeit 
counter-intuitive: lawsuits are best brought during boom times, when the 
state can most afford a substantial liability award.33 In that respect, it might 
be wiser to conceive of the strategic aim of school finance litigation as the 
creation of a rainy-day fund than as a last ditch tactic during a flood. 
The implications for legal theory are more nuanced. One takeaway 
concerns the general project of constitutional interpretation. With the recent 
confirmation of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, 
there has perhaps never been greater public attention to the methodological 
question of how constitutional cases ought to be decided. Some 
commentators have argued that current legal practice reflects a sufficient 
 
Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of Educational Rights 
Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1902–07, 1915–23 (describing the two earliest waves of state-
level school finance litigation and identifying an emerging third wave).  
31. See infra Parts IV & V.A. 
32. We also find some interesting results when the data is analyzed in cross-sections. For 
example, the significance of party control over the legislature is most prominent in cases that count as 
“liability rulings,” or cases where the state’s liability is effectively determined in either direction. Judges 
seem to show no such sensitivity to party control, however, when deciding procedural issues that do not 
determine the state’s liability. 
33. Of course, our findings suggest that other variables will affect judicial decision-making, too, 
but they may be less within plaintiffs’ control. For instance, some states are likely never to be controlled 
by a Democratic legislature; others will presumably always be so controlled. So it would be unwise for 
litigators to await such shifts. Likewise, while school spending will likely increase naturally during 
periods of economic prosperity, notice that it should do so with relative uniformity across the nation (all 













degree of consensus to conclude that “originalism is indeed our law,”34 a 
view that is seemingly bolstered by the originalist dispositions of Justice 
Gorsuch35 and (arguably) Justice Kavanaugh.36 The results of our analysis 
illuminate originalism’s positive law claim, at least as it applies to state 
constitutional law:37 our study suggests that at least in one prominent area 
of state constitutional law, the original public meaning of the text carries 
less weight than prudential considerations such as the state’s fiscal health or 
which party controls the legislature.38 
 A second takeaway concerns what Professor Daryl Levinson has called 
the “remedial equilibration” model of constitutional law.39 Under this 
model, the meaning of constitutional rights is not settled in a vacuum; it is 
instead shaped by judicial appraisals of “the threat of undesirable remedial 
consequences” that “motivat[e] courts to construct the right in such a way 
as to avoid those consequences.”40 Our findings offer strong support for this 
thesis, as state court judges appear to be heavily influenced in their 
construction of the state constitutional right to education by the real-world 
(i.e., budgetary) effects of their decision.41 
 
34. William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351–52 
(2015); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817 (2015). 
35. See Nina Totenberg, Judge Gorsuch’s Originalism Contrasts with Mentor’s Pragmatism, 
NPR (Feb. 6, 2017, 4:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/06/513331261/judge-gorsuch-s-originalis 
m-philosophy-contrasts-with-mentors-pragmatism [https://perma.cc/6DUG-RK5D] (describing 
Gorsuch as a “self-proclaimed originalist”). 
36. Ann E. Marimow, Brett Kavanaugh, Trump’s Supreme Court Pick, Has Sided with Broad 
Views of Presidential Powers, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018, 9:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/p 
olitics/courts_law/brett-kavanaugh-trumps-supreme-court-pick-has-sided-with-broad-views-of-preside 
ntial-powers/2018/07/09/1618bec0-83a8-11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html [https://perma.cc/6GG4 
-NUK8] (arguing that “Kavanaugh is a proponent of ‘originalism’”). But see Eric Posner, Is Brett 
Kavanaugh an Originalist?, ERIC POSNER BLOG (July 18, 2018), http://ericposner.com/is-brett-kavanau 
gh-an-originalist/ [https://perma.cc/V5TG-YU6Y] (finding little evidence that he is). 
37. See Baude, supra note 34, at 2399–400 (observing that “[m]any scholars seem to assume that 
the case for originalism in state constitutional law simply mirrors that for originalism in federal 
constitutional law” but noting that the strength of originalism’s claim in each state “will turn on each 
state’s political and legal culture”). 
38. As we will explain, infra Part V.C.2, our findings are actually consistent with so-called new 
originalism, which recognizes the distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction and 
permits normative values to inform judicial decision-making at the construction stage. See Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 472 (2013); see also 
infra Part V. But our findings are in conflict with the kind of originalism suggested by those such as 
Justice Gorsuch himself, who once explained that judges should not consider the policy consequences 
of their decisions but “should instead strive to apply the law as they find it, focusing backwards.” 
Totenberg, supra note 35 (quoting then-Judge Gorsuch). 
39. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858 (1999). 
40. Id. at 885. 
41. See infra Part V.C.1. 












One final caveat is in order. We do not mean to suggest that the variables 
we find are the only determinants of school finance litigation outcomes. 
Judges are undoubtedly attuned to numerous factors, some of which our 
models surely fail to identify. But until now, the literature had yet to 
convincingly identify any significant variable with the confidence generated 
by regression against a robust sample size. Ours is thus a first step toward a 
better understanding of why some state courts vindicate the rights of 
disadvantaged children to an adequate or equitable education while others 
do not. 
I. OUR EXISTING KNOWLEDGE BASE  
In this section, we situate our study in an existing body of literature 
regarding the determinants of judicial outcomes. The Part begins with a 
brief discussion of judicial prediction models generally, before presenting 
the limited universe of findings specific to the school finance litigation 
arena. 
A. Brief Primer on the Study of Judicial Decision-Making 
Since the reign of Legal Formalism ended at the turn of the 20th century, 
scholars have generally abandoned the proposition that judicial decision-
making is strictly determined by the text of the law itself.42 Most legal 
scholars now believe that legal categories are under-determined—their 
application subjective and their meaning mutable.43 As scholars working in 
a variety of fields have come to suspect that legal decisions do not stem 
directly from legal texts themselves, they have generated a growing body of 
scholarship aimed at describing the factors that do influence judicial 
decision-making.44 These factors can be grouped under several broad 
headings—legal, ideological, institutional, and political—though, in 
practice, analyses usually adopt a model that blends factors from each.  
 
42. E.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and 
the Crisis of Democratic Theory, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 359 (Lawrence 
M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., enlarged ed. 1988). 
43. There have been a variety of different traditions of legal scholarship that ascribe to some or 
all of these propositions that have gone variously under the titles Legal Realism, Law and Society, and 
Critical Legal Studies. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); 
Lawrence M. Friedman, Essay, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Robert 
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). Even the emergent camp of New 
Originalists recognizes the under-determined nature of certain constitutional disputes. See infra Part 
V.C.2. 
44. E.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and 













The first set of factors that might influence judicial decision-making, and 
the one most consistent with traditional notions of judging, encompasses 
certain legal factors such as the presence of specific fact patterns, the 
strength of existing precedent, or the particular wording of statutory or 
constitutional clauses.45 Sometimes these legal models take on more 
elaborate forms with scholars arguing that judges are constrained by legal 
categories but engage in strategic behavior about, for instance, when to 
follow precedent or how quickly to respond to new precedent.46 Likewise, 
judges may be more persuaded by the rulings or legal reasoning of some 
courts more than others.47  
A second set of factors focuses on what might be termed judicial 
ideology. This is the general idea that judges do not simply “call balls and 
strikes,” but have specific preferences for certain specific policy outcomes 
or kinds of outcomes (e.g., limited government).48 Scholars, using a variety 
of data and analytic techniques, have tried to identify the composition and 
strength of these ideologies as well as their association with certain personal 
characteristics of judges.49 Though the value, strength, and predictive power 
 
45. Id.; Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers: An Individual-
Level Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases, 48 J. POL. 938 (1986) (finding that fact patterns in search 
and seizure cases are associated with court rulings). 
46. See Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court 
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 545–46 (2002) (noting that legal 
complexity of decisions and area of law, specifically criminal procedure, are significant factors); Paul 
Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States, 48 
POL. RES. Q. 5, 20 (1995) (noting the importance of facts in death penalty cases); Frank B. Cross & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998) (noting that changes in precedent 
constrain judicial preferences by creating the possibility of a “whistleblower” who will call deviations 
from precedent). 
47. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State 
Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 180 (1985); Robert J. Hume, The Impact of Judicial 
Opinion Language on the Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
127 (2009); Rorie Spill Solberg, Jolly A. Emrey & Susan B. Haire, Inter-Court Dynamics and the 
Development of Legal Policy: Citation Patterns in the Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 277 (2006). 
48. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (opening 
statement of then-Judge John Roberts). To be clear, scholars, even those who adhere solely to the study 
of legal texts and the development of legal doctrines, recognize that individual judges differ in their 
personal views and stance toward the law—that they are “liberal” or “conservative” or have expansive 
views on the role of the judiciary. What distinguishes the work referenced here is the push to quantify 
these views and subject them to hypothesis testing. For a nice discussion of the history of these efforts 
and the debates they produced, see Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial 
Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 
(2001). 
49. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation 
 












of these variables have been subject to debate,50 scholars have examined the 
influence of variables such as party affiliation,51 the party of the appointing 
official, or, for federal judges, an ideology score of his home state senator,52 
as well as some social background characteristics53 like race,54 gender,55 or 
prior professional experience.56 Though recent efforts to develop a common 
“score” of judicial ideology show some promise,57 in general, scholars have 
found the explanatory power of these variables quite limited.58 
A third set of potentially influential factors relates to the larger 
institutional arrangements in which courts are embedded. For instance, 
judges may seek to maintain their professional and institutional legitimacy 
by following a consensus position reached by other courts.59 Likewise, 
judges may feel more or less constrained by the security of their position on 
the court. Judges who are required to stand for election may be more likely 
to hew to the views of the broader public than those who receive a lifetime 
 
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) 
(creating MCMC scores, a way of measuring justice ideology); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift 
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007). 
50. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 49; Gillman, supra note 48. 
51. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 49; Gerard S. Gryski & Eleanor C. Main, Social 
Backgrounds as Predictors of Votes on State Courts of Last Resort: The Case of Sex Discrimination, 39 
W. POL. Q. 528 (1986); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 843 (1961). 
52. This is the basis of the increasingly common “Judicial Common Space” Score. See Micheal 
W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan 
Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001); Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). 
53. We incorporate these into the discussion of ideology because, unless one believes that 
personal characteristics like gender mechanically produce certain worldviews, the variable is serving as 
a proxy for some broader set of personal experiences that work to influence one’s policy preferences 
and views of the law. 
54. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in 
Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences 
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998) (finding 
no significant influence of race on decision-making); Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do 
Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126 (1988). 
55. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects 
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The 
Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985). 
56. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the 
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); 
Gryski & Main, supra note 51 (each concluding that prior judicial experience was of limited predictive 
value). 
57. E.g., Epstein et al., supra note 52; Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the 
Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062 (2009). 
58. For a useful recent summary, see Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial 
Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009).  













appointment.60 These institutional arrangements are unlikely to be strictly 
determinative but may nevertheless be an important factor. 
Finally, if we believe that judges are, at least in part, policy actors who 
seek to use the law to secure their preferred policy outcomes, then we would 
expect that, like legislatures, they would be attuned to the broader political 
context. Thus, scholars have examined the extent to which judicial decision-
making is associated with measures of the political environment. For 
example, some researchers have investigated whether judges consider the 
partisan composition of the legislative and executive branches in reaching 
their decisions. Judges may exercise restraint, for instance, if they suspect 
their decision will result in legislative backlash against the ruling or 
jeopardize their legitimacy with the public at large,61 or try to calibrate their 
rulings to the values and partisan leanings of the public at large.62 Beyond 
considerations of political control, there are also questions concerning the 
general policy-making environment. For example, judges may look ahead 
to the costs associated with complying with a ruling and, for instance, be 
more reluctant to create new financial liabilities for the state in the midst of 
a recession.63   
Although scholars have explored the explanatory power of variables 
from each of these broad categories in the context of several areas of law 
ranging from the death penalty64 to search and seizure65 to products 
liability,66 one challenge is often the lack of variation in key variables of 
interest. For instance, because there is only one U.S. Constitution, it is not 
possible to test how, say, a differently worded First Amendment might 
affect free speech jurisprudence. For this reason, one fruitful area for 
exploring judicial decision-making has been state school finance litigation. 
Not only has school finance litigation been attempted in nearly every state 
over a period spanning nearly half a century—providing considerable 
variation in political, institutional, and ideological variables—but state 
constitutions differ in the wording of their education clauses, providing an 
 
60. E.g., Brace & Hall, supra note 46, at 24. 
61. Scholars have begun to evaluate these choices using Game Theory. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing 
a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89 (2011). 
62. E.g., Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, 
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997). 
63. Staci L. Beavers & Jeffrey S. Walz, Modeling Judicial Federalism: Predictors of State Court 
Protections of Defendants’ Rights Under State Constitutions, 1969–1989, 28 PUBLIUS 43, 57–58 (1998) 
(finding that court decisions are associated with state wealth).  
64. E.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 
86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992). 
65. E.g., Segal, supra note 44.   
66. E.g., Robert C. Bird & Donald J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and the Diffusion of the 
Strict Liability Rule for Manufacturing Defects, 1963–87, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 565 (2012). 












ideal test for a key legal variable. Thus it becomes possible for scholars to 
consider the relationship between the outcomes of these various cases and 
legal variables like the wording of the state constitution as well as political 
or contextual variables like the partisan leanings of the state or the health of 
the economy. Indeed, to date there have been five empirical quantitative 
investigations of the factors associated with outcomes of school finance 
cases as well as several additional qualitative investigations of the same 
question.67 In the next Part we briefly discuss the analytic approach to 
investigating the sets of variables discussed above, their findings, 
limitations, and the need for additional empirical investigations.   
B. Prior Studies of School Funding Lawsuit Determinants 
There is no shortage of papers that have examined the judicial and 
political dynamics of individual school funding lawsuits on a qualitative 
basis.68 For example, in an exquisitely detailed study, William Koski 
examines the divergent outcomes of school finance cases in Ohio and 
Wisconsin.69 The two states exhibited similarities on a number of key 
variables: both states are diverse; varied in their economies and 
geographies; had strong Republican governors who opposed changes to the 
finance system; and had state supreme courts that had previously rejected 
constitutional challenges to the school finance scheme.70 Yet, as Koski 
details, the Ohio Supreme Court declared the state’s funding scheme 
unconstitutional while the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the opposite 
outcome. In explaining these contrary rulings, Koski engages in a close 
study of each of the individual judges’ particular ideologies on a range of 
legal issues to determine that judicial policy preferences (as well as the 
variation in political support for the litigation between the two states) played 
 
67. See infra Part I.B. 
68. See, e.g., Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from School 
Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 676 (2001) (arguing that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court’s pro-plaintiff decision led to policy successes because “[b]y the time the 
courts reached their decision points, reformers had generated a good deal of political support among 
citizens and other interest groups . . . [such that] judges inclined to think in strategic terms would have 
had less and less to fear in terms of opposition from other institutions or citizens”); Douglas S. Reed, 
The People v. the Court: School Finance Reform and the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 137, 143, 153–54 (1994) (arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in favor 
of plaintiffs in Abbott II led to electoral backlash against Democrats and “cost the court its political 
allies”); see also generally William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 
EDUC. POL’Y 376 (1994); William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1185 (2003). 
69. Koski, supra note 6. 
70. Id. at 1083 (discussing the selection of Ohio and Wisconsin because the two states look very 













a meaningful role in driving the ultimate result of the lawsuits.71 As Koski 
points out, however, a subsequent shift in electoral support in Ohio put the 
court on the defensive and raised questions about the court’s institutional 
legitimacy.72 
These case-by-case qualitative studies are helpful in painting a picture of 
courts that are attentive to both the broader political climate as well as to 
questions of institutional legitimacy and, in turn, institutional constraints. 
But given the substantial legal, factual, political, and cultural differences 
across the fifty states, these qualitative studies do not lend themselves to 
confident conclusions about how judges decide school finance cases 
generally. Our primary interest in this paper is therefore to extend prior 
quantitative investigations of school finance outcomes on a systematic 
basis.  
Before doing so, it makes sense to consider the existing quantitative 
literature. The first such paper involved an examination of the rulings of 
forty state supreme courts on the question of the constitutionality of the 
state’s school finance system.73 The author, Karen Swenson, elected to use 
the outcome of the most recent state high court decision in each state along 
with a variety of legal, political, and institutional covariates. These 
covariates included variables for the strength of the state’s education clause, 
method of judicial selection, rulings of other state high courts, whether the 
legislature recently passed school finance legislation, and measures of 
school spending and spending inequities, as well as several measures of the 
character and strength of state political ideology.74 Using logistical 
regressions, the author used these data to test a series of hypotheses about 
the relationship between these variables and the outcomes of the 
constitutional challenges.  
These analyses identified very few variables as associated with the 
rulings in each case. For instance, Swenson found no association between 
outcomes and the method of judicial selection, the strength of the education 
clause, size of wealth disparities, recent legislative reform, or the sitting 
governor’s party affiliation.75 She did find, however, some limited support 
for the significance of per pupil expenditures (states with higher 
expenditures were less likely to have their systems ruled unconstitutional) 
and the strength of the ideological leanings of the state (supreme courts in 
states with more liberal electorates were more likely to declare funding 
 
71. Id. at 1167–70. 
72. Id. 
73. Swenson, supra note 1. 
74. Id. at 1170–71 (providing a full list of variables included in the model).  
75. Id. at 1174–77. 












systems unconstitutional).76 These results, and the general lack of support 
for most of the author’s hypotheses, led Swenson to question whether “a 
state scheme of school finance will be declared unconstitutional depends 
almost solely on the whimsy of the state supreme court justices 
themselves.”77  
A second article by Paula Lundberg took up the same question with a 
slightly different analytic approach.78 Similar to Swenson, Lundberg 
examined the relationship between a variety of legal and extra-legal 
variables and state supreme court rulings on school finance cases.79 
Lundberg also restricted her case sample to a single decision by the highest 
court in each state that had considered the constitutionality of the state’s 
school funding system.80 Unlike Swenson, however, Lundberg included two 
cases each from Arizona and Ohio because in both states an initial state high 
court ruling upholding the constitutionality of the school finance system was 
supplanted by a subsequent state high court ruling that the systems were, in 
fact, unconstitutional.81  
In addition to this slight modification in inclusion criteria, Lundberg 
makes a more extensive change to the covariates included in her logistical 
regression model.82 Lundberg includes the same general categories of 
variables—legal, political, institutional—but in a more elaborated form.83 
For instance, in addition to variables for the ratio of state per pupil spending 
to the national average, Lundberg includes a variable comparing average 
state and national teacher salaries.84 Likewise, she includes not just a 
measure of state liberalism but, for instance, incorporates measures of state 
per capita income; a measure of whether the state generally has 
“traditionalistic,” “moralistic,” or “individualistic” political cultures; and, 
with respect to institutional measures, whether judges are elected, the length 
of their term, and party identification.85  
 
76. Id. at 1176–78. 
77. Id. at 1178. 
78. Lundberg, supra note 6. 
79. Id. at 1132, 1134–37, 1140–41, 1145 (providing the list of variables and regression 
coefficients for each variable in the analysis).  
80. Id. at 1105 (“The number of cases analyzed in the model (forty-one) . . . . make[s] up the 
entire existing population of state high court decisions on the constitutionality of school funding.”). 
81. Id. at 1103–04; see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc); Hull v. 
Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); 
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
82. Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1104.  
83. Compare id. at 1105–32 (discussing the construction and operationalization of each variable 
in the logistic regression models), with Swenson, supra note 1, at 1170–71. 
84. Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1110.  













Despite this much more extensive set of control variables, Lundberg’s 
analysis does not offer much more illumination about the relationship 
between school finance decisions and legal, political, institutional, or 
ideological variables included in the study. None of the features of the state 
school system (e.g., expenditures) were associated with the rulings86 nor 
were any of the measures of judicial partisanship or institutional design 
(e.g., elected judges).87 Lundberg did find a small relationship between the 
state court outcomes and several of the political variables in her data set.88 
State per capita income was positively associated with rulings in favor of 
the plaintiffs, as was the characterization of the state’s political culture as 
“traditionalistic”—a finding the author considered counterintuitive.89 
Lundberg also found a negative relationship between the percent urban 
population and rulings in favor of challenges to state funding systems.90 
Swenson and Lundberg deserve a great deal of credit for undertaking the 
first systematic analyses of the factors influencing school funding lawsuit 
outcomes. Both studies, however, suffer from significant weaknesses. First 
and foremost, the decision to include only a single state high court decision 
unnecessarily limits each article’s statistical and analytical power.91 
Lundberg herself recognizes the analytical significance of the fact that state 
supreme courts can, and do, revisit constitutional questions and often 
change the meaning of constitutional rights in the process.92 But having 
made the decision to include subsequent re-hearings in Ohio and Arizona, 
it is hard to justify the exclusion of other instances when state supreme 
courts have revisited the question of the constitutional sufficiency of school 
finance systems.  
Though Lundberg insists that “the court determination of the 
constitutional meaning of the state’s education and equal protection clauses 
is contained in the original decision, while subsequent cases are generally 
 
86. Id. at 1133, 1135. 
87. Id. at 1136–37. 
88. Id. at 1140–41. 
89. Id. Lundberg adopts the measures used by Daniel J. Elazar in American Federalism: A View 
from the States. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 114–22 (3d 
ed. 1984). According to Elazar, traditionalistic political cultures are generally suspicious of government 
action and government intervention into people’s problems. Id. at 20. Lundberg hypothesized that 
traditionalistic states would likely be the most unequal on account of their legislative restraint because 
judges, “as products of that culture, would vote to uphold their respective legislative school funding 
schemes.” Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1126. 
90. Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1146.  
91. For a discussion of why our study is able to analyze a far greater number of decisions without 
raising the kinds of auto-correlation concerns feared by Swenson and Lundberg, see infra Part II.A. 
92. Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1103–04 (“Supreme courts in . . . Arizona and Ohio[] originally 
declined to overturn their school funding systems, but later overruled these decisions . . . . As these two 
state decisions address the constitutional meaning of equal protection and education, both cases will be 
included in the models.” (footnote omitted)). 












concerned with judicial enforcement,”93 this is a view that is at odds with 
the large body of doctrinal and qualitative analyses of school finance 
litigation. Indeed, the whole notion of “third wave” school finance cases is 
premised on the idea that courts in many states could change the substantive 
meaning of the state’s education right—substituting adequacy for equity—
without needing to overturn the court’s initial determination.94 Treating 
these cases as a one-way ratchet captures, at best, only part of the picture of 
factors associated with rights adjudication and at worst distorts the picture 
by creating an observation criteria that is selectively inclusive.   
And in any case, decisions that Lundberg would qualify as mere 
“enforcement” disputes are themselves of profound importance in cashing 
out the concrete meaning of educational rights.95 Much like the right to 
school desegregation announced in Brown was cashed out (for better or 
worse) through decades’ worth of enforcement decisions,96 the right to equal 
or adequate educational access is ultimately empty until it is given shape 
and substance by subsequent judicial review of legislative responses. There 
is no reason to believe that judges would be sensitive to extra-legal 
considerations in the first instance and not subsequently. Moreover, just as 
with the Brown legacy, the stiffest test of a court’s ideological and political 
commitment to secure educational rights may come after—not before—the 
initial recognition of the state’s obligation. Indeed, the qualitative, 
historical, and doctrinal analyses of school finance cases are full of 
descriptions of courts making a bold start before losing their nerve.97    
A third investigation by Yohance Edwards and Jennifer Ahern98 takes 
the work of Swenson and Lundberg as its starting point (the authors use all 
the same variables)99 and seeks to extend it by investigating whether the 
variation in judicial outcomes is explained by differences in the 
predominant race and setting (city/non-city/coalition) of the plaintiff 
 
93. Id. at 1104. 
94. E.g., Clune, supra note 68, at 385. 
95. Consider the extreme example of New Jersey school finance litigation that spanned some 
two decades and involved ten state supreme court decisions. For a discussion of the history and judicial 
evolution, see generally Reed, supra note 68; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational 
Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND 
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
96. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 39, at 874–78. 
97. The case of New Jersey’s mid-course shift from an equity to an adequacy standard is but one 
of many examples. See generally Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 95.  
98. Yohance C. Edwards & Jennifer Ahern, Note, Unequal Treatment in State Supreme Courts: 
Minority and City Schools in Education Finance Reform Litigation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 326 (2004). 













districts in each case.100 Edwards and Ahern seek to examine this hypothesis 
by performing an analysis of the most recent state high court decisions in 
each state (forty-one total).101  
Given the small sample size, the authors decided not to attempt 
regression analysis and to instead report the differences in the variables of 
interest by case outcome (plaintiff win or state win).102 The authors also 
created a cross-tabulation—a table where the cells contain information 
about the relationship between two or more variables, as in the success rate 
of school finance cases for city versus non-city school district plaintiffs, or 
for city school district plaintiffs in predominantly African American 
districts—to examine the relationships between the variables of interest and 
the variables for predominant race of plaintiff school districts and the 
district setting.103 The authors argued that because they used the entire 
population of relevant cases (rather than a sample) they do not need to 
subject their results to statistical testing.104 On this basis, the authors 
concluded that predominantly minority districts and city school districts 
were less likely to succeed in school finance challenges than non-minority, 
non-city districts. The authors also found that plaintiffs succeeded more 
often in cases in front of elected judges; in cases when there were more 
plaintiff school districts involved; and, as with Lundberg, in cases brought 
in states with a “traditionalistic” political culture.105 
While providing suggestive evidence for their hypothesis, the value of 
this analysis is significantly limited by the authors’ decision to provide only 
basic descriptive statistics and the decision not to subject the mean 
differences they found to tests of statistical significance. Such tests would 
have provided insight about whether the differences reflected a real pattern 
or could be attributed to variation that might be expected in a small sample 
of cases. Rather than use a test of statistical difference in means, as is 
standard practice in the social sciences, the authors opted a priori to establish 
a difference of ten percentage points between categorical variables and 
thirty percentage points for continuous variables as evidence of a 
 
100. Id. The impetus for this investigation was a qualitative analysis by James Ryan, id. at 326, 
that argued that urban and minority plaintiffs have been less successful as plaintiffs and that the level of 
public and legislative backlash to successful judgements (e.g., New Jersey, Arizona, Texas) has been 
qualitatively different than those in cases brought by white and/or rural plaintiffs (e.g., Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Massachusetts). James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 433–34 (1999). 
101. Edwards & Ahern, supra note 98, at 332. 
102. Id. at 333 n.41. 
103. Id. at 346. 
104. Id. at 353. 
105. Id. at 348–49. 












“meaningful magnitude.”106 Likewise, the analytical approach did not allow 
the authors to control for other potentially salient variables as they 
calculated their cross-tabulations, making it impossible to say whether there 
are confounding variables that account for the differences they report. That 
is, their results do not allow them to speak to the significance of their 
variables, like race or location of the school district, independent of the 
association of other variables to their outcomes.107 These limitations are in 
addition to the definitional issues concerning which cases should be 
included in the analysis. The choice to use only the most recent case from 
each state, rather than the full sample of state supreme court rulings,108 not 
only incorporates all the conceptual analytical problems about the nature of 
“the law” included in the Swenson and Lundberg analyses, but the decision 
also biases the sample significantly toward more recent (“third wave”) 
outcomes. The selective inclusion also prevented the authors from providing 
even a suggestive, straightforward count for the most direct test of their 
hypothesis. After all, what better way to test the relationship between 
plaintiff traits and outcomes than to compare outcomes in the same state 
with different plaintiffs?   
More recently, two additional papers by social scientists have tried to 
create a more complex picture of judicial decision-making in school finance 
cases by bringing state supreme court decisions into relationship with the 
actions of state legislatures and with the rulings of other state supreme 
courts.  
The first of these articles, by Roch and Howard, begins from the premise 
that courtrooms are essentially policy venues.109 Reformers looking to 
secure changes in school finance systems, therefore, make decisions about 
whether to pursue those changes by legislative or judicial means. 
Legislators and judges, in turn, recognize this “venue shopping,” so to 
speak, on the part of reformers and strategically determine their own 
behavior in response to what the other branch of government might do. 110 
Roch and Howard operationalize this insight by estimating two separate 
statistical models—one each for judicial “reform” (court ruling) and 
legislative reform.111 In both models the authors incorporate a set of 
 
106. Id. at 348. 
107. Id. at 352 (acknowledging that “there were not enough cases in the analysis to create a 
multivariable statistical model, which would have allowed the authors to look at the effects of the 
predictors of interest, while simultaneously accounting for the effects of the other variables”). 
108. Id. at 347. 
109. Christine H. Roch & Robert M. Howard, State Policy Innovation in Perspective: Courts, 
Legislatures, and Education Finance Reform, 61 POL. RES. Q. 333, 334 (2008). 
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variables relating to the legal, political, institutional, and ideological aspects 
of the state as well as variables that seek to capture “strategic 
considerations” on the part of the judiciary and legislature respectively.112   
On the basis of these models the authors conclude that both legislatures 
and courts engage in strategic behavior.113 Specifically, they find that 
legislatures are more likely to engage in legislative reform in states that have 
appointed judiciaries, which they interpret as a sign of legislatures taking 
matters into their own hands rather than leaving it to an unaccountable 
(appointed) judiciary.114 Roch and Howard also find that appointed state 
supreme courts are less likely to overturn school finance systems, though 
appointed judges are more likely to do so in instances of large disparities in 
educational spending.115 Again, they interpret these results as judges being 
strategically selective when stepping into the “policy reform” arena. 
Though Roch and Howard argue that they provide evidence of the 
“interactive process of legislative and judicial decision making,”116 their 
argument is not totally convincing. First, despite the article’s framing, 
neither of their models actually includes a measure of governmental branch 
interaction: the legislative model does not control for prior actions of the 
judiciary and vice versa.117 Not only is there no direct measure of this 
interaction, but the legislative model treats legislative reform as a one-time 
event—states drop out of the data set after they have enacted legislative 
reform.118 Given the history of school finance reform has been described as 
an ongoing dialogue—a “colloquy”119—between the legislature and 
judiciary this is a peculiar operationalization of the article’s core analytic 
interest. Second, the significant variables in the specified models do not 
appear to tell a coherent story.120 It is not clear why, for instance, legislatures 
 
112. Id. at 339 tbl.1, 341 tbl.2 (tables indicating the variables included in the respective models).  
113. Id. at 342 (“The results of our analyses also largely support this idea of the different 
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116. Id. at 342.  
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would be more likely to act in states with appointed judiciaries and in states 
with weaker constitutional protections and weaker teachers’ unions. Weaker 
constitutional protections would make it harder for the judiciary to act, 
thereby reducing pressure on the legislature to enact reform, and teachers’ 
unions are almost always in favor of increased educational spending and 
would seem to provide precisely the kind of political cover required of the 
strategic policy maker.121 If all of this is evidence of strategic inter-
governmental behavior, it is of a very peculiar sort that, at the very least, 
requires further investigation. 
In a final paper, Howard, Roch, and Schorpp try to analyze whether 
judicial rulings on school finance systems “diffuse” across state lines in the 
same way that scholars have shown policy ideas diffusing among state 
legislatures.122 The theory runs that following a ruling of unconstitutionality 
by a court in one state, courts in other states may “emulate” this behavior 
either, for example, because they are persuaded by the ruling’s logic or 
because they do not want to be seen as out of step with other courts—
responding to what institutional theorists might call isomorphic pressures.123 
They predict that courts are likely to follow rulings from other states that 
are most ideologically and politically similar.124 They operationalize this 
emulation model by creating dyads in which every state appears twice—
once in which they are “receiving” the opportunity of emulation from 
another state that has enacted court-ordered reform; and once in which, if 
they have enacted court-ordered reform, they are “sending” to other states 
an invitation to emulate their decision.125 Each state in the dyad has a set of 
independent covariates and the dyad itself also has a set of covariates (e.g., 
 
appointed judges (+). Court-ordered reform—population density (+); individualistic political culture (+); 
constitutional provision (+); appointed judges (-); interaction between appointed judges and variation in 
educational spending (+). Roch & Howard, supra note 109, at 339 tbl.1, 341 tbl.2. 
121. Joshua M. Cowen & Katharine O. Strunk, The Impact of Teachers’ Unions on Educational 
Outcomes: What We Know and What We Need to Learn, 48 ECON. EDUC. REV. 208, 218–19 (2015) 
(finding that, in general, the presence of teachers’ unions and measures of teacher union strength are 
associated with increased educational expenditures). 
122. Robert M. Howard, Christine H. Roch & Susanne Schorpp, Leaders and Followers: 
Examining State Court-Ordered Education Finance Reform, 39 LAW & POL’Y 142 (2017). 
123. The authors do not use this phrase, opting for “emulation,” but we think it is useful 
descriptively especially given that neo-institutionalists place an emphasis on formal emulation even 
when the underlying substance can vary widely—a description that would seem to capture the large 
variation in meaning of school finance cases even as states have formally converged on finding in favor 
of educational adequacy rights. This is also true because, as we explain below, the authors are not 
capturing actual “emulation”—what they are measuring, if anything, would be more accurately 
described as formal mimicry. On the potential fruitful exchange between neo-institutionalism and legal 
studies, see generally Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New 
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996) (book review). 
124. Howard, Roch & Schorpp, supra note 122, at 143.  













a measure of the ideological similarity between the pair of states). The 
authors run the model twice, one time for each of the time periods reflecting 
the second and third waves of school finance litigation. On this basis the 
authors find that there are differences between the sender and receiver 
characteristics between the two waves, and that as the ideological 
differences between states’ courts and governments decrease, the likelihood 
of “emulation” increases.126  
This paper represents a substantial advance from prior work in its more 
inclusive view of the relevant cases—incorporating all state supreme court 
cases, not just the first or most recent—and its more robust conception of 
historical time—not just the recognition of the waves of reform but the 
notion that states, themselves, are repeat players in the process. 
Unfortunately, the methodological approach taken in the analysis is not 
fully able to support this more expansive historical approach to the subject 
matter. For instance, the authors conclude that “sender state courts are less 
likely to act as leaders if legislative reform has already occurred in their 
state.”127 But this is almost certainly a function of the way the authors have 
operationalized their variables. A state becomes a “sender state” from the 
time of its first decision for each year going forward. The longer a state has 
been a sender state, the more likely it will have engaged in legislative 
reform. When a receiver state does finally “emulate” the sender states, it 
will appear (statistically) as though it is following the most recent sender 
states (i.e., the ones who are least likely to have engaged in legislative 
reform). This conclusion seems more likely a statistical artifact than a 
political or strategic one on the part of those involved. 
This challenge of interpreting the authors’ findings points to a larger 
difficulty with the paper: the authors do not model emulation as the term is 
generally understood—as an explicit attempt to copy or follow the example 
of, in this case, another state’s legislative ideas. Rather than focus on the 
intent or content of a state’s “emulation” of another state, the authors count 
a state as emulating all prior states that have enacted court-ordered reform 
and model changes in variables associated with decisions over time. To the 
extent that more states necessarily entertain constitutional challenges over 
time, the interpretive meaning of this “emulation” breaks down. This 
breakdown is hinted at when the authors’ model finds that, in the third wave, 
courts were more likely to engage in emulation the further apart they were 
ideologically and the further apart their states were in their political 
ideologies.128 Without an account of the substantive content of the 
 
126. Id. at 161. 
127. Id. at 159. 
128. Id. at 162.  












emulation, it seems more accurate to say that, by 2002, courts began to 
engage in a kind of formal signaling in the recognition of student fiscal 
adequacy rights.129 The model, however, tells us very little about the 
circumstances under which courts did so or how the meaning and substance 
of children’s education rights evolved as a result. 
* * * 
Considered together, these studies provide suggestive evidence for the 
general value of examining how different factors—legal, political, 
ideological, and institutional—are associated with judicial decision-making 
in school finance cases. The studies correctly identify that the long, 
variegated history of state school finance cases provides a uniquely rich 
opportunity to analyze these questions quantitatively. But the statistical 
approaches used to analyze this history have not done that history justice. 
All but one of these studies mechanically constrained the relevant data, and 
even the most inclusive approach rendered its view too narrow by including 
all the state supreme court cases through the period in question but ignoring 
the hundreds of other instances of courts at all levels considering these 
issues.  
Put simply, a full account of judicial decision-making on the 
constitutionality of school finance systems must include a full account of 
the judicial decisions on the constitutionality of school finance systems. The 
Part that follows explains how we are able to build a broader data set to 
drive our analysis.  
II. DATA 
Our study utilizes a unique data set comprising 318 school finance 
decisions issued by state courts between 1971 and 2017. This Part explains 
the selection criteria used to delimit the relevant sample of state court 
decisions before describing the variables included in our analysis. 
A. The Sample 
As mentioned, previous attempts to identify variables capable of 
predicting the outcome of school funding lawsuits have utilized 
uncommonly small sample sizes. The leading law review articles by Karen 
 
129. This is similar to courts value-signaling the importance of discrimination and colorblindness 
even as they began to invert its meaning. This issue was a major theme of commentary on Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). See, e.g., James 













Swenson and Paula Lundberg ran regressions on data sets containing just 
the most recent forty and forty-one state high court rulings,130 
respectively.131 The stated reason for this limited number of observations 
was “to avoid problems with autocorrelation” that might arise if previous 
state high court rulings were included.132 
In our view, this self-imposed limitation was unnecessary in three key 
respects. First, and most significantly, Swenson and Lundberg seem to 
assume without explanation that only decisions issued by state courts of last 
resort should count for purposes of identifying variables that may predict 
school finance lawsuit outcomes. The best argument we can think of in 
defense of that assumption is that in our system of appellate judicial review, 
higher courts often grant significant deference to lower court findings of 
fact, particularly when factual determinations are based on witness 
credibility.133 Including opinions issued by a trial court and an appellate 
court in the same case might thus raise issues of autocorrelation, insofar as 
higher court rulings would in theory correlate heavily with those from the 
trial courts.  
This argument is incorrect. For one thing, the level of autocorrelation is 
something to be demonstrated statistically rather than preemptively as a 
decision rule, which was not done by prior authors. For another, school 
funding lawsuits do not commonly turn on findings of fact; they turn on 
questions of law such as the legal meaning of the state’s education clause or 
whether the dispute raises a non-justiciable political question.134 When 
higher courts review these kinds of legal conclusions reached by lower 
courts, hornbook law instructs them to apply a de novo standard of 
review.135 At the point at which intermediate appellate and state high courts 
are literally considering the constitutionality of a school funding system 
 
130. A note on terminology: to avoid confusion, we use the terms “state high court” and “state 
court of last resort” to denote what most people think of as a state’s supreme court. We do so because 
some states (e.g., New York) refer to their trial courts as “supreme courts” and use the term “Court of 
Appeals” to refer to their highest appellate court.  
131. Swenson, supra note 1, at 1150; Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1105. 
132. Swenson, supra note 1, at 1151. 
133. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 
witnesses’ credibility.”).  
134. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (“In 
defining [the constitution’s use of the term] ‘efficient,’ we use all the tools that are made available to us. 
In spite of any protestations to the contrary, we do not engage in judicial legislating. . . . We simply take 
the plain directive of the Constitution, and, armed with its purpose, we decide what our General 
Assembly must achieve in complying with its solemn constitutional duty.”); Conn. Coal. for Justice in 
Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 218 (Conn. 2010) (“[B]ecause an issue regarding justiciability 
raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary.” (quoting Office of the Governor v. Select 
Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 727 (Conn. 2004))). 
135. See supra notes 29, 30 and accompanying text. 












“anew,” it seems reasonable to treat each level of decision as an independent 
event worthy of analysis. 
A second aspect of Swenson and Lundberg’s autocorrelation concern 
involves decisions by state courts on remedial questions issued after the 
state court of last resort’s initial liability finding.136 Again, however, we 
think this is unduly self-limiting. It’s true that school finance plaintiffs will 
often return to court to argue that a state legislature’s proposed remedy is 
constitutionally deficient.137 But why should a state court’s disposition of 
these follow-on challenges necessarily be correlated with the outcome of 
the initial liability ruling, as opposed to the proper meaning of the education 
clause or some other variable? To assume that follow-on remedial disputes 
are determined by earlier liability rulings is to assume that school finance 
plaintiffs who won an initial ruling will win subsequent challenges ad 
infinitum (no matter how much the state legislature has done to make good 
on its duty!) simply because the plaintiffs won the first time around. 
Needless to say, that assumption is belied by the record.138 
Finally, the choice to include only a single state high court ruling in the 
data set fails to capture that subsequent rounds of school finance litigation 
in the same state often involve different legal theories. Scholars have long 
recognized that state-level school finance litigation has encompassed 
different waves of litigation founded on two distinct kinds of litigation 
strategies known as the “equity” and “adequacy” theories.139 In the earlier 
equity wave, plaintiffs typically alleged that unequal school finance systems 
violated state equal protection guarantees; in the latter they alleged that the 
same funding systems failed to provide some absolute level of “adequate” 
education guaranteed under a state education clause.140   
For present purposes, what matters is that plaintiffs have sometimes 
failed on one of these theories only to succeed on the other. Thus, for 
 
136. See Swenson, supra note 1, at 1151 (“Also excluded are follow-up cases reaching the high 
courts addressing the sufficiency of the remedy enacted by the state legislature.”). 
137. One of the most significant state school finance cases, the Abbott v. Burke saga in New Jersey, 
has been ongoing since the initial complaint was filed in 1981. Since that time, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has issued twenty-one opinions in the case, many of which resolve challenges to the sufficiency 
of particular legislative remedies. See generally The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR., http://edl 
awcenter.org/litigation/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html [https://perma.cc/2WWF-F2NY]. 
138. For instance, our analysis finds nine pro-plaintiff New Jersey Supreme Court rulings post-
dating the initial plaintiff’s liability victory in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990), but also six 
rulings in favor of the state. And after the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled for plaintiffs in Campbell 
County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995), the state prevailed in the two major 
remedial challenges thereafter. See State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001); 
Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43 (Wyo. 2008).  
139. See, e.g., Koski, supra note 30, at 1903–07 (describing the differences between these legal 
theories); Clune, supra note 68. 













example, an early equal protection claim failed in New York, but a later 
adequacy claim based on the state’s education clause succeeded.141 The 
opposite pattern occurred in California, where plaintiffs won a famous 1976 
equity ruling, Serrano v. Priest,142 only to lose a more recent adequacy 
lawsuit.143 These examples show that subsequent rounds of state court 
litigation often implicate different legal questions. Where that is so, it is 
reasonable to include each round as an independent observation. 
Each of these reasons explains our decision to include state decisions 
irrespective of court level and why our data set includes many more cases 
than prior analyses. Still, despite the many reasons to think that subsequent 
rounds of litigation can be treated as essentially independent observations, 
there remains a lingering possibility that there may be other unobservable 
factors particular to each state (perhaps a particular reverence for precedent 
or a cultural expectation about educational rights) that might interfere with 
the independence of school finance litigation outcomes within a given state. 
In order to be conservative in our estimates and to reduce the possibility that 
our results are biased by collinearity within a state (whatever the source), 
we take the additional methodological step below of clustering the standard 
errors in our analytic models by state.144  
But of course we must also offer a principled account of the kinds of 
cases we rule out. This was a somewhat less difficult task two decades ago, 
when there was less variety in the kinds of education reform lawsuits 
brought in state court.145 Yet now that a growing number of suits are being 
filed on behalf of a range of groups and are seeking a range of remedies,146 
it is particularly important to identify what, exactly, qualifies a case as a 
“school finance lawsuit” for purposes of our study—and what does not. 
Each of the state court decisions in our data set satisfies four criteria. 
First, the decision had to involve a particular kind of legal challenge: an 
alleged violation of a state constitutional provision. Lawsuits alleging 
violations of federal or state statutory law fall outside the scope of our 
analysis because they fail as a definitional matter to inform our core 
 
141. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365–68 (N.Y. 1982) (rejecting equal 
protection challenge to school finance system), with Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 
N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ adequacy claim based on the state 
education clause and holding that the clause “requires the State to offer all children the opportunity of a 
sound basic education”). 
142. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
143. Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888 (Ct. App. 2016).  
144. See infra Part III. 
145. See Koski, supra note 30, at 1915–16 (describing a more recent “next-generation” of 
educational rights litigation that focuses on “specific, identifiable educational ‘wrongs,’” specific groups 
of “identifiable students,” and that targets “particular statutes” or the “denial of a specific resource”). 
146. See id. at 1916–23 (describing recent lawsuits). 












question: what determines the outcome of school finance lawsuits alleging 
state constitutional violations?147 Examples of cases touching on important 
education policy matters that were excluded under this rule include Renee 
v. Duncan,148 a lawsuit challenging teacher qualification rules promulgated 
under the federal No Child Left Behind Act, and L.M. v. State,149 a lawsuit 
alleging violations of a Michigan statute concerning students needing 
special assistance in reading. 
Under our second criterion, a case must have been one in which plaintiffs 
sought a particular kind of relief—namely, an order invalidating the state’s 
system for funding its public schools. We include this condition because we 
are interested in school finance cases where a finding for plaintiffs would 
impose a substantial burden on state lawmakers to redesign the way in 
which tax revenues are distributed for public education. By contrast, cases 
that are brought under state constitutional provisions but do not target the 
state’s school funding system are not included—for example, recent high-
profile challenges to state teacher tenure laws are excluded by this rule.150 
Third, we did not include cases where the remedy sought by plaintiffs 
was financial in nature, yet circumscribed due to geographic limitations in 
the nature of the suit. For example, the California Supreme Court ruled in a 
case called Hartzell v. Connell that a school district’s practice of charging a 
$25 fee for participation in extracurricular activities violated a state 
constitutional provision guaranteeing access to free public schools.151 This 
ruling satisfies the first two criteria because it is both predicated on a state 
constitutional violation and concerned with school funding.152 However, the 
crux of the legal claim was that a single school district in Santa Barbara 
should cease its extracurricular fee practice.153 Narrow invalidations of this 
sort lie outside our area of primary concern, which is to identify variables 
 
147. That is not to say that state or federal statutory claims are unimportant or uninteresting. It is 
to say, however, that the predictors of the outcomes of those cases may differ systematically from the 
predictors of statewide school finance lawsuits, whether because statutes are typically drafted in much 
clearer fashion or because they involve less sweeping remedial obligations by defendants. 
148. 686 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) (invalidating Department of Education regulation 
permitting teachers participating in alternative certification programs to count as “highly qualified” for 
purposes of the No Child Left Behind Act). 
149. 862 N.W.2d 246, 250, 253 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no private right of action in state 
statute requiring school officials to provide “special assistance” to underperforming students to bring 
their “reading skills to grade level within 12 months”). 
150. See Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied sub nom. Vergara 
v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. S234741, 2016 Cal. LEXIS 8387 (Aug. 22, 2016) (rejecting argument that 
California teacher tenure laws violate the state equal protection clause). 
151. 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984) (en banc). 
152. See id. at 38 (“The first question raised by plaintiffs’ challenge is whether extracurricular 
activities fall within the free education guaranteed by section 5.”). 













that predict judicial behavior in cases raising substantial statewide liability 
against the state itself.154  
Finally, our data set excludes cases where relief is sought on behalf of 
special subgroups of student plaintiffs. To illustrate, in School Districts’ 
Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, plaintiff 
advocacy groups sued the state of Washington arguing that the legislature’s 
failure to fully fund special education violated the state constitution.155 The 
case satisfies each of the three previous criteria, as it is premised on a state 
constitutional violation, seeks an order invalidating the state’s system for 
funding K–12 education (albeit solely with respect to special education), 
and applies statewide.156 We do not include it in our data set, however, 
because we cannot rule out the possibility that the ultimate outcome was 
influenced by considerations relating to the particular identity of the 
plaintiff children, all of whom had disabilities and thus received special 
education services.157  
To be sure, the plaintiff students in the set of school finance cases that 
are included in our population—children who attend low-income, low-
achieving school districts—are also in some sense a “special” population 
that is distinguishable from all public K–12 education students writ large. 
But what matters for our purposes is that we are able to hold that affected 
population group constant across all of the cases in our study. To do so 
necessitates excluding cases brought solely on behalf of different subgroups 
of students. 
A team of research assistants generated a list of all decisions with a 
plausible claim of satisfying our four criteria. Two primary sources were 
used to generate this initial list: a comprehensive, interactive database of 
state-level school finance decisions compiled by the Center for Educational 
Equity at Teachers College,158 and Westlaw, which includes reported and 
unreported decisions searchable on a state-by-state basis. The authors then 
analyzed each decision for consistency with the stated criteria, and 
performed independent searches to identify cases that may have been 
 
154. We recognize that this criteria is in some sense a matter of degree, insofar as rulings in favor 
of plaintiff children often result in targeted funding increases for particular at-need districts, which in 
turn implies a geographic limitation. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408–09 (N.J. 1990) 
(establishing twenty-eight so-called “Abbott districts” entitled to a remedy for state constitutional 
violations). But we can still safely rule out cases like Hartzell v. Connell, where a ruling for plaintiffs 
does not lead to the restricting of the state’s entire school funding apparatus. Hartzell, 679 P.2d 35.  
155. 244 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (finding no constitutional violation). 
156. See id. at 2. 
157. Likewise, a case like D.J. v. State, which involves claims brought specifically on behalf of 
English language learners, is not included in our data set. See D.J. v. State, B.S. 142775 (settled before 
official opinion issued), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DJ-v.-State-of-Californi 
a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y637-WR62]. 
158. See www.schoolfunding.info (as of Aug. 15, 2018). 












missed during the initial pass through. The result is a total universe of 318 
state court decisions included in the Appendix.159  
B. Variables 
We coded a number of variables corresponding to each court decision in 
our data set. Two variables are self-explanatory: the year of decision and 
the level of court that issued the ruling (trial, intermediate appellate, or court 
of last resort). Several other variables warrant further discussion. 
Who prevailed? This is the dependent variable we seek to explain. For 
each decision in our data set, we coded whether the state or plaintiffs 
prevailed. In cases implicating just a single issue for resolution, this was 
simple. But other rulings required judgement. That is because in some 
decisions, courts resolve more than one legal question. If the court rules in 
favor of the state on one question but the plaintiffs on another, a judgment 
call must be made as to whether the case is really a “win” for one side or 
the other.   
To illustrate, consider the trial court’s ruling in the path-breaking New 
York case, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State.160 Plaintiffs in that 
case sued on both equity and adequacy grounds.161 The trial court dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ equity claim, but found in plaintiffs’ favor on the adequacy 
claim.162 We code this outcome as a win for plaintiffs because by denying 
the motion to dismiss the adequacy count, the trial court opened the state to 
significant potential liability—liability which was ultimately upheld by the 
state court of last resort.163 Other instances of mixed rulings are coded a 
state victory;164 still other split decisions were removed from the sample 
altogether for lack of a clear prevailing party.165 We recognize some of these 
cases involved close judgement calls; in all cases this outcome was 
 
159. The total number of cases that met our criteria for inclusion is 318. Because of incomplete 
data for the other variables in our regression models, the maximum number of cases used in our analysis 
is 313. The full data file, including coded variable data, is available upon request. 
160. 616 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
161. Id. at 855–56. 
162. Id. at 856. 
163. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003). 
164. See, e.g., Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d 133, 141 (Or. 2009) (en banc) (agreeing 
with plaintiffs’ demand for a “declaratory judgment [stating] that the legislature failed to fully fund the 
public school system” but refusing to issue a judgment that the legislature must actually fund the public 
school system at the requested levels). 
165. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 604 (N.J. 2002) (granting state’s request to suspend 
some remedial requirements for one year in light of a budget crisis, but rejecting the state’s plea to 
terminate the procedure by which urban districts could seek supplemental funding above established 













independently coded twice with any coding disagreement settled through 
further discussion by the authors. 
Was the decision a liability or non-liability ruling? Because our sample 
includes court decisions both leading up to the actual entry of judgment in 
a case and after it (at least in the case of plaintiffs’ victories where 
subsequent follow-on challenges are filed), the possibility arises that 
different variables could possess varying levels of explanatory force across 
two kinds of decisions: those that effectively resolve the state’s substantive 
legal liability (in either direction) and those that do not. In other words, 
judges may be more sensitive to certain variables (such as economic 
conditions or party control over the legislature) in substantive rulings than 
in procedural rulings (and vice versa). We accordingly code each decision 
as either a liability ruling or a non-liability ruling. 
Where a case falls between these two categories is readily apparent in 
some cases. A court’s decision to strike down the state’s school finance 
system clearly qualifies as a liability ruling,166 as does a decision on the 
other end (e.g., a decision dismissing a lawsuit because the state’s education 
clause imposes no actionable duty or because the suit is a non-justiciable 
political question).167 Conversely, a decision by a higher court to defer a 
ruling on whether the state is in violation of its constitution so that 
lawmakers have additional time to remedy deficiencies is plainly a 
procedural, non-liability ruling.168   
Other cases are more difficult, such as when an appellate court rules that 
the plaintiffs’ complaint contains legally sufficient allegations to establish 
liability, but remands the matter to the trial court for further investigation 
into the uncertain evidentiary basis for those allegations.169 We code such 
decisions as non-liability rulings because the implication is that the state’s 
ultimate liability remains an open question. Another complex choice arises 
when plaintiffs who have prevailed in initial challenges to school funding 
systems file follow-up challenges (often years after the initial ruling) 
 
166. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d 326; Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).  
167. See, e.g., Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R, 200 P.3d at 141 (state education clause imposes no 
actionable duty on the state to fund public education at prescribed amounts); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. 
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191–93 (Ill. 1996) (dismissing adequacy claim as a nonjusticiable political 
question). 
168. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1021 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter DeRolph II], 
overruled by DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001).    
169. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 235–36 (Kan. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s sua 
sponte grant of summary judgment in the defendant state’s favor because “there remain . . . genuine 
issues of material fact” that the trial court must resolve before entering judgment); Leandro v. State, 488 
S.E.2d 249, 261 (N.C. 1997) (reversing dismissal of case and remanding to trial court to determine 
whether “competent evidence [exists] to the effect that defendants in this case are denying children of 
the state a sound basic education”). 












arguing that the legislature has failed to satisfy its constitutional 
obligations.170 Our approach is to code such rulings on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the scope of the relief sought.171 
The remaining twelve variables in our study are included as plausible 
determinants of school finance outcomes. They include the following: 
Percent State Population Urban. This refers to the percentage of a state’s 
population that resided in an urban area during the decade in which a 
decision was announced.172 
Percent State Population Minority. This variable refers to the percentage 
of a state’s population that was non-white during the decade in which a 
decision was announced.173 
Traditionalistic State Culture. The political scientist Daniel Elazar 
famously categorized the fifty United States into three types of political 
subcultures.174 In traditionalistic states, citizens and their elected officials 
are thought to display a general distaste for governmental interventions to 
resolve social problems.175 In moralistic states, by contrast, the 
government’s role is thought of in more positive terms, as an active force 
for good.176 Individualistic states occupy a middle ground, where politicians 
have no pre-set inclination in either direction.177 Lundberg found an 
indicator of traditionalistic states to be significant (although in the opposite 
direction as expected, as judges in traditionalistic states are actually more 
likely to rule for plaintiffs), so we include it in our analysis, too.178 
 
170. See, e.g., supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. 
171. Compare, e.g., Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 83 (Wyo. 2008) (upholding 
the state legislature’s finance system in light of substantial improvements to its funding system) (coded 
as non-liability ruling), with Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1034–35 (N.J. 2011) (finding New Jersey 
legislature out of compliance with its constitutional duty after it failed to fully fund its statewide school 
finance formula by a staggering $1.6 billion) (coded as a liability ruling). 
172. This data derives ultimately from decennial census data, which explains our inability to 
provide year-on-year figures. Urban Percentage of the Population for States, Historical, IOWA 
COMMUNITY INDICATORS PROGRAM, https://www.icip.iastate.edu/tables/population/urban-pct-states [h 
ttps://perma.cc/4HU7-NQQ5] (decade-by-decade table summarizing census data).  
173. This data also derives from decennial census data. Note that “non-white” population includes 
persons who identify as Hispanic on the census. Historical Population by State or Territory, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_non-Hispanic_white_population#Historical_pop 
ulation_by_state_or_territory [https://perma.cc/D2B5-DVFM] (table summarizing state-by-state figures 
in each decade).  
174. ELAZAR, supra note 89, at 114–25. 
175. Id. at 118. 
176. Id. at 117. 
177. Id. at 115. 
178. We follow Lundberg’s dichotomous approach of coding traditionalistic states as 1 and all 













Elected judges.179 We also code each ruling based on the mechanism 
through which the relevant level of judicial decision maker obtained her 
office. We include two dichotomous variables: whether the judge was 
elected (1) or not (0), and whether the judge was initially appointed and then 
subject to a retention election (1) or not (0). The reference (omitted) 
category here is whether judges were appointed and not subject to election 
thereafter.180   
Party Legislature Control. We code variables that indicate which 
political party controlled the state legislature during the year of decision. 
One variable indicated uniform Democratic control. Decisions issued in a 
period when the legislature was split were indicated by a second variable. 
Republican control served as the omitted reference category.181    
 
179. We recognize that selection procedure captures only one potential influence on a judge’s 
consideration of a case. Ideally we would like to include a “judicial ideology” score for the judges. 
Unfortunately, sophisticated mechanisms that allow scholars to calculate judicial ideology over time, 
such as the Judicial Common Score, involve leveraging the norm of senatorial courtesy in the 
appointment of federal court judges. Because our cases involve state court judges and different 
appointment procedures across states, these techniques are unavailable to us.  
Another potential variable would be to draw on party identification as measured by a judge’s own 
party (in states with elected judiciaries) or the party affiliation of the governor who made the relevant 
appointment. Yet this variable is also beset by data and accuracy limitations. As to data, a significant 
number of judges are elected via non-partisan elections. At last count, twenty-two states elect trial court 
judges in this way, fifteen elect appellate court judges via non-partisan ballots, and thirteen elect 
members of their courts of last resort in this manner (accounting for 31 percent of all state high court 
Justices). See Nonpartisan Election of Judges, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Nonpartisan_electi 
on_of_judges [https://perma.cc/KQT4-LEXR]. Perhaps even more importantly, prior research suggests 
that party identification is an inaccurate measure of judicial ideology. For one thing, the vast majority 
of studies focused on federal court judges, not state court judges—with even fewer still focused on 
lower-court state judges. Moreover, the most comprehensive survey of the literature, a meta-analysis, 
concluded that “no meaningful weighted-mean estimates of party’s impact in lower state courts are 
available” based on the existing literature. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in 
American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999). Though many studies have found 
modest associations between party identification and court rulings, these findings suggest the size of the 
association is strongly dependent on the kind of case with criminal cases having the largest associations. 
The correlations are much smaller for cases involving economic regulation and civil rights. Id. at 241. 
In the one instance that we are aware of where research examined judge party identification in the context 
of school finance cases, the party identification was not a useful predictor of judges’ rulings. See Koski, 
supra note 6, at 1112–13, 1227 (finding that the Ohio Supreme Court that declared the state’s finance 
system unconstitutional in DeRolph consisted of five Republicans and two Democrats; and that two of 
the judges who voted to strike down Ohio’s funding system, despite their Republican party 
identification, were “liberal on economic issues”). All in all, the combination of missing data and the 
limited utility of data that exists counseled against inclusion of a party identification variable in our 
study. Still, we acknowledge the possibility that judicial ideology—however defined or measured—may 
play a meaningful (if hard-to-measure) role in the outcomes of school finance cases.  
180. This data was drawn from Ballotpedia’s helpful judicial selection database. Judicial Selection 
in the States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_the_states#Details_by_state 
[https://perma.cc/8DJU-DA36].  
181. State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.n 
csl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/TW5S-WR7U]. 
 












National Unemployment. We include a variable reflecting the national 
unemployment rate during the month of decision.182 
State Unemployment. We also include a similar variable corresponding 
to the state unemployment rate during the month of decision.183 
National GDP Change. This variable refers to the percentage change in 
the national GDP from the year before the year of decision. For example, 
for a decision issued in May 2016, we would input the percentage change 
in national GDP from 2015 to 2016.184  
State GDP Change. This is the corresponding percentage change in GDP 
calculated on a state-by-state level. Again, the data used reflects the change 
in GDP from the year preceding the relevant decision to the year of the 
decision itself.185 
Strength of Education Clause. Legal scholars have long wondered 
whether variation in school finance outcomes might be explained by 
differences in the strength of the education clauses across state 
constitutions.186 Building on the work of Erica Black Grubb’s 1974 article 
examining state constitutional provisions in the context of the right to 
bilingual education,187 Professor Gershon Ratner established a four-tier 
typology of state education clauses that continues to be influential today.188 
 
We were required to deviate from the methodology described above for Nebraska, the only state with a 
non-partisan legislature. Because our inquiry is whether Nebraska judges will be sensitive to perceptions 
of the legislature’s partisan composition, we coded Nebraska court decisions for this variable based on 
the parties’ respective shares of the following statewide offices: the governorship, U.S. Senate seats (2), 
and U.S. House of Representative seats (3). When Republicans possessed a majority of those six 
statewide offices at the time of decision, a decision was coded 1 (for Republican control). When 
Democrats held a majority, a decision was coded 2. We coded 3 for decisions where the six statewide 
offices were split evenly.  
182. We obtain this data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ interactive data viewer. See BLS 
Data Viewer, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/LNS14000000;jses 
sionid=1C1CF215CBF34671B0B340C987BC2A14 (data collected in July 2017 and August 2018). 
Note that in a few cases, where we know the year but not the specific month of decision, we used the 
unemployment rate during the month of June on the theory that it is likely to show the least variance 
from the actual decision date. 
183. This data is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ interactive data finder. See BLS Data 
Finder 1.1, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://beta.bls.gov/dataQuery/find?fq=survey:%5Bla%5D&s=popula 
rity:D (data collected in July 2017 and August 2018).  
184. Data was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s interactive data application, 
online at https://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). Data for all decisions from 
1972 through 2016 were collected in July 2017. Data for decisions in 2018 were collected in August 
2018. 
185. State-by-state data was likewise obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 
interactive data tool, see id. 
186. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
187. Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52 (1974). 
188. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in 













Both of the empirical analyses discussed above rely on Ratner’s typology,189 
which rank-orders education clauses from weak (Tier 1, “contain[ing] only 
general education language”), to modest (Tier 2, “emphasiz[ing] the quality 
of public education”), to strong (Tier 3, “contain[ing] a stronger and more 
specific education mandate”), to strongest (Tier 4, “mandat[ing a] strong[] 
commitment to education”).190 For the sake of consistency, we use the same 
four-step scale to code the strength of the education clause in each state 
court decision. We use separate indicator variables for each level of the 
scale, omitting Tier 1 as the reference category. 
Education Spending vs. the Nation. We include a variable representing 
each state’s relative spending level on education in comparison to the then-
prevailing national average. The variable is a percentage representing the 
per pupil spending level in each state as a percentage of the national average 
during the year of the court decision.191 
Ratio of Lowest to Highest District Spending. Finally, we included a 
variable intended to capture the level of inequality in educational spending 
within a state. This variable was constructed by creating a ratio of the lowest 
to highest per pupil expenditure among school districts in the state.192 A 
higher ratio would be evidence of a state with less inequality in school 
spending between districts.193  
Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 1. 
  
 
189. See Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1108 (describing Ratner’s four-point scale); Swenson, supra 
note 1, at 1157–58 (describing four tiers of clauses as explicated by William Thro, who in turn relies on 
Professor Ratner’s typology). 
190. Ratner, supra note 188, at 815–16. 
191. Data for this variable is obtained from the most proximate annual Public Education Finances 
reports issued by the U.S. Census Bureau, available online at https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/school-finances/library/publications.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2019). 
192. The ratio was calculated based on data contained in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Public 
Education Finances reports. See id. The reports include per-pupil expenditure data for all districts in a 
state with more than 10,000 students. For each decision, we calculated the ratio of the lowest reported 
spending district to the highest reported spending district in the year closest to the decision. 
193. These last two variables—spending versus the nation and ratio of low district to high 
district—represent our effort to control for the relative strength of the “facts” of the plaintiff’s case. We 
recognize that there might be unobserved variables that relate to the timing of bringing certain cases. 
We acknowledge that advocates spend a great deal of time strategizing and trying to pick the right 
moment to file, but given the lack of agreed upon factors associated with success in this type of litigation 
we are skeptical that this type of guesswork biases our results. Also, given that these cases often last for 
years (if not decades), even if advocates successfully select the right moment for the initial filing, it is 
hard to imagine they are simultaneously able to predict that the environment will remain favorable until 
the final resolution of the case.  













Descriptive Statistics of Study Cases. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ruling in favor of state 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Percent urban population 72.63 14.57 32.2 95 
Percent minority population 22.08 12.53 1.9 59.9 
Traditionalistic 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Judges appointed 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Judges elected 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Judges appointed then elected 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Republican legislative control 0.38 0.40 0 1 
Democrat legislative control 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Split legislative control 0.20 0.40 0 1 
National unemployment rate 6.02 1.44 3.9 10.2 
State unemployment rate 5.79 1.83 2.3 14.5 
National GDP change 5.68 2.64 -2.1 12.9 
State GDP change 6.05 4.02 -4.2 29.3 
Education amendment strength (1) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Education amendment strength (2) 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Education amendment strength (3) 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Education amendment strength (4) 0.11 0.31 0 1 
State education spending v. nation 1.01 0.27 0.61 1.87 
Ratio of low/high district funding 0.69 0.15 0.26 1 
 
III. METHOD 
We use linear probability models to predict the probability courts rule in 
favor of the state.194 Our models take the general form 
Yijk	=	β0	+	Xijkβ1	+	εijk.	
Here, Yijk is a variable that indicates whether the court ruled in favor of 
state i in case j in year k. Vector Xijk comprises the covariates whose 
 
194. We use linear probability models for ease of interpretation but confirm our results with 
logistic regressions that are more theoretically appropriate for our dichotomous outcomes. Our logistic 
regression results are not qualitatively different from the linear probability results and are available from 













relationship with court decisions we are testing and εijk is an observation-
specific error term. 
As we have explained above, there are strong reasons to think that 
individual state court decisions are independent of one another given the de 
novo standard of review of legal questions and the fact that subsequent 
rounds of litigation often involve distinct issues. Still, given the possibility 
that decisions by one court may still influence the subsequent decisions of 
courts in similar cases in the same state or the possibility that states have 
particular cultures around these types of cases, it is possible that each 
decision observation in our data is not strictly independent of others in the 
same state. This represents a potential violation of the main assumptions of 
linear regression. To account for this, we cluster our standard errors at the 
state level.  
Because of some missingness in the data, we run four separate models, 
each including an increasing number of covariates. This choice serves two 
purposes. First, it allows us to run the models for as many cases with 
complete data as we can. Second, it allows us to check for the consistency 
of our results as more covariates are added and as cases are dropped from 
the model because they include missing data. Model (1) controls for the 
state population that is non-white, the percentage that lives in urban areas, 
whether the state is traditionalistic, the indicators for whether judges are 
elected or appointed and then elected, the indicators for the control of the 
state legislature, and the national unemployment rate. Model (2) includes all 
of the covariates from Model (1), and adds the state unemployment rate, 
national and state GDP change, and indicators for the strength of the state’s 
education amendment. Model (3) adds to Model (2) the state’s education 
spending versus the rest of the nation. Finally, Model (4) adds the ratio of 
state spending between the highest and lowest funded district.195 
Because the average results for all cases may hide variation between 
different ruling types (e.g., liability vs. non-liability) and court levels, we 
repeat all four models for six subsets of the data. First, we run the analysis 
including all cases in the data. Second, we include only liability rulings. 
Third, we look only at non-liability rulings. Finally, we look separately at 
rulings issued by trial courts, intermediate courts, and courts of last resort.  
 
195. We ran additional models with other covariates including the percent of the state population 
that lives in poverty, measures of the state debt, and national and state unemployment and GDP change 
in the prior rather than current year. Because of high missingness in these variables, and because they 
did not appear related to whether courts ruled in favor of the state, we omit these variables from the 
analysis. Results that include these variables are available from the authors upon request.  













Table 2 gives the results of our analysis for all cases in the data. Because 
we use linear probability models, the coefficients (when multiplied by 100) 
are interpreted as percentage point changes in the likelihood of a case being 
decided in favor of the state. For example, the interpretation of the “Percent 
Urban” coefficient in Model (4) is that every percentage point increase in 
the percentage of a state’s population that lives in urban areas is associated 
with an 0.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood a judge rules in favor 
of the state. This coefficient is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. Across most model specifications, the factors most consistently related 
to state victories include how judges are selected for and maintain their 
positions, the control of the state legislature, and state and national 
economic performance. Relative to judges who are appointed for life, judges 
who are appointed and thereafter face election to maintain their position are 
between seventeen and twenty-five percentage points more likely to rule in 
favor of states. These relationships are roughly similar in size to how much 
more likely judges are to rule in favor of the state when Democrats control 
the state legislature than when Republicans do. Judges also appear more 
likely to rule in favor of the state when the legislature is split between 
Democrats and Republicans than when the Republicans have sole control. 
Finally, across all cases, judges appear about five to six percentage points 
less likely to rule in favor of the state for each percentage point of national 
GDP growth. There is some evidence that state GDP growth is also related 
to judges’ decisions in favor of the state, though this relationship is smaller 















Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in Favor 
of the State, All Cases. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
% Urban 0.000  0.003  0.004  0.003  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
% Minority 0.001  -0.004  -0.006  -0.007  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Traditionalistic -0.134  -0.045  0.021  -0.035  
 (0.096)  (0.112)  (0.118)  (0.126)  
Elected Judges 0.174 + 0.168 + 0.143  0.196  
 (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.115)  (0.120)  
Judges Appointed then Elected 0.225 ** 0.166 * 0.173 + 0.255 * 
 (0.069)  (0.082)  (0.099)  (0.119)  
Democrat Legislative Control 0.156 * 0.201 ** 0.199 ** 0.212 * 
 (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.081)  
Split Legislative Control 0.129  0.196 * 0.168 + 0.219 * 
 (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.092)  
National Unemployment -0.013  -0.029  -0.020  -0.020  
 (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  
State Unemployment   -0.004  -0.013  -0.006  
   (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
National GDP Change   -0.063 ** -0.063 ** -0.049 ** 
   (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  
State GDP Change   0.019 * 0.020 * 0.019 + 
   (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  
Ed Amendment Strength (2)   -0.007  0.034  -0.024  
   (0.076)  (0.083)  (0.079)  
Ed Amendment Strength (3)   -0.016  -0.018  0.022  
   (0.098)  (0.092)  (0.125)  
Ed Amendment Strength (4)   0.043  0.100  0.000  
   (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.106)  
Education Spending v. Nation     0.133  0.143  
     (0.132)  (0.154)  
Ratio of Low/High District 
Funding  
 
    -0.332  
       (0.330)  
Intercept 0.343  0.541 * 0.339  0.552  
  (0.276)  (0.258)  (0.323)  (0.474)  
N 313  297  278  247   
Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 












The results for just liability cases are presented in Table 3. In part 
because liability cases represent a majority of the cases in a total data set, 
these results largely mirror the results in Table 2. The relationship between 
Democratic legislative control and an increased likelihood of a ruling in 
favor of the state remains strong and consistent across the models. So, too, 
is the relationship between a strong national economy and rulings in favor 
of plaintiffs. One difference in considering the results of liability cases is 
that the relationship between a ruling in favor of the state and judicial 
selection procedures is stronger than it is overall. Judges who are appointed 
and then elected are anywhere from twenty-two to thirty-six percentage 
points more likely to rule in favor of the state in liability decisions than when 
they are appointed without the need for reelection. Though the results are 
only marginally significant, judges who are always elected are similarly 
nineteen to twenty-six percentage points more likely to rule in favor of the 
state. We also find that in liability cases the state’s education funding 
relative to the nation is marginally significant. That is, within the subset of 
liability cases only, courts are more likely to rule in favor of the state when 















Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in Favor 
of the State, Liability Cases Only. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  






































Elected Judges 0.195 
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Ratio of Low/High District Funding 
     
-0.320  
 























Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 












In non-liability cases, only the economic variables are significant. As 
shown in Table 4, for each percentage point improvement in national GDP, 
judges are nine to fourteen percentage points less likely to rule in favor of 
the state. In contrast, if the state GDP goes up by a percentage point, judges 















Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in Favor 
of the State, Non-Liability Cases Only. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
% Urban 0.004  0.000  0.000  -0.002  
 (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  
% Minority -0.021 ** -0.006  -0.012  -0.010  
 (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.017)  
Traditionalistic 0.158  0.134  0.253  0.236  
 (0.170)  (0.202)  (0.231)  (0.282)  
Elected Judges -0.220  -0.172  -0.069  -0.157  
 (0.200)  (0.196)  (0.267)  (0.214)  
Judges Appointed then Elected -0.270  -0.414 * -0.175  -0.307  
 (0.187)  (0.198)  (0.312)  (0.332)  
Democrat Legislative Control 0.099  0.089  0.043  0.079  
 (0.126)  (0.148)  (0.165)  (0.235)  
Split Legislative Control 0.056  0.139  0.159  0.218  
 (0.176)  (0.168)  (0.162)  (0.219)  
National Unemployment -0.036  -0.057  -0.047  -0.070  
 (0.030)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.070)  
State Unemployment  -0.022  -0.009  0.008  
  (0.065)  (0.070)  (0.090)  
National GDP Change  -0.088 * -0.096 + -0.136 ** 
  (0.036)  (0.048)  (0.046)  
State GDP Change  0.057 * 0.063 * 0.074 ** 
  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.024)  
Ed Amendment Strength (2)  0.305  0.304  0.334  
  (0.178)  (0.197)  (0.209)  
Ed Amendment Strength (3)  0.187  -0.044  -0.157  
  (0.285)  (0.304)  (0.369)  
Ed Amendment Strength (4)  -0.037  -0.055  -0.079  
  (0.190)  (0.194)  (0.302)  
Education Spending v. Nation   0.325  0.255  
   (0.346)  (0.364)  
Ratio of Low/High District Funding    -0.415  
    (0.823)  
Intercept 0.930  1.043 + 0.573  1.192  
  (0.562)  (0.561)  (0.780)  (0.848)  
N 72  69  60  55  
Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 












Because we were curious whether judges’ decisions vary in their 
association with these variables depending on the court level, we ran our 
models separately for trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and courts 
of last resort. We found the importance of GDP performance is still apparent 
when we look just at trial courts. In these cases, as before, judges are less 
likely to rule for the state the greater the change in national GDP (shown in 
Table 5). In contrast, none of the covariates we measured appear related to 
rulings in favor of the state at the intermediate court level (Table 6), 
although this may in part be due to the limited number of intermediate court 















Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in 
Favor of the State, Trial Court Cases Only. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
% Urban -0.007  -0.004  -0.002  -0.007  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
% Minority 0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.006  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Traditionalistic -0.066  -0.026  0.014  -0.042  
 (0.110)  (0.122)  (0.161)  (0.173)  
Elected Judges -0.015  -0.040  -0.055  -0.064  
 (0.145)  (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.161)  
Judges Appointed then Elected 0.097  0.020  0.033  0.109  
 (0.135)  (0.137)  (0.134)  (0.146)  
Democrat Legislative Control 0.109  0.107  0.096  0.089  
 (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.102)  
Split Legislative Control 0.197  0.219 + 0.215 + 0.284 * 
 (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.121)  (0.129)  
National Unemployment 0.011  -0.013  -0.016  -0.010  
 (0.040)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.060)  
State Unemployment   0.012  0.014  0.011  
   (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.042)  
National GDP Change   -0.076 ** -0.083 ** -0.084 ** 
   (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.027)  
State GDP Change   0.034 * 0.037 * 0.028  
   (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.019)  
Ed Amendment Strength (2)   -0.004  0.032  -0.023  
   (0.099)  (0.100)  (0.101)  
Ed Amendment Strength (3)   0.002  -0.020  0.014  
   (0.134)  (0.123)  (0.168)  
Ed Amendment Strength (4)   0.050  0.088  -0.041  
   (0.187)  (0.183)  (0.178)  
Education Spending v. Nation     0.083  0.151  
     (0.187)  (0.203)  
Ratio of Low/High District Funding      -0.716  
       (0.520)  
Intercept 0.769 + 0.993 * 0.800 + 1.709 * 
  (0.426)  (0.385)  (0.449)  (0.760)  
N 131 124 120 107 
Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
  













Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in 
Favor of the State, Intermediate Court Cases Only. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
















































































































National Unemployment -0.104 
 










































































































Education Spending v. Nation 











Ratio of Low/High District Funding 




      
(0.653) 
 
Intercept 2.006 * 2.313 ** 2.508 ** 2.238 * 








N 42  42  41  39  
Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 














In contrast to judges on trial courts, economic factors do not appear 
associated with rulings by courts of last resort. Instead we find that 
legislative control is most strongly and consistently associated with these 
courts’ judgments. At the court of last resort level, judges are up to thirty 
percentage points more likely to rule in favor of the state if the legislature 
is controlled by Democrats relative to control by Republicans. These results 
are presented in Table 7. There is also some suggestive evidence that judges 
who are appointed and then elected are more likely to rule in favor of the 
state than judges who are appointed, but these results only achieve marginal 
significance in two of our models.  
  













Linear Probability Models of the Likelihood a Case Was Decided in 
Favor of the State, Courts of Last Resort Only. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  
% Urban 0.005  0.007  0.007  0.003  
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  
% Minority -0.002  -0.006  -0.009  -0.004  
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
Traditionalistic -0.242  -0.127  -0.009  -0.170  
 (0.175)  (0.191)  (0.182)  (0.178)  
Elected Judges 0.243 + 0.207  0.203  0.209  
 (0.134)  (0.172)  (0.256)  (0.289)  
Judges Appointed then Elected 0.294 + 0.285 + 0.319  0.449  
 (0.146)  (0.161)  (0.229)  (0.280)  
Democrat Legislative Control 0.213 * 0.287 * 0.282 * 0.296 * 
 (0.105)  (0.114)  (0.122)  (0.133)  
Split Legislative Control 0.126  0.234 + 0.164  0.221  
 (0.120)  (0.124)  (0.140)  (0.156)  
National Unemployment -0.003  0.004  0.028  0.018  
 (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.034)  
State Unemployment   -0.036  -0.057 + -0.037  
   (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.027)  
National GDP Change   -0.037  -0.031  0.002  
   (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.030)  
State GDP Change   0.002  0.001  0.004  
   (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.020)  
Ed Amendment Strength (2)   0.099  0.150  0.099  
   (0.119)  (0.139)  (0.135)  
Ed Amendment Strength (3)   0.011  -0.008  0.165  
   (0.169)  (0.171)  (0.155)  
Ed Amendment Strength (4)   0.108  0.184  0.072  
   (0.196)  (0.203)  (0.168)  
Education Spending v. Nation     0.386  0.362  
     (0.294)  (0.334)  
Ratio of Low/High District Funding      -0.283  
       (0.437)  
Intercept -0.088  0.028  -0.405  -0.198  
  (0.388)  (0.401)  (0.544)  (0.847)  
N 140 131 117 101 
Notes. Variables indicating whether judges are appointed, Republicans 
control the state legislature, or the education amendment strength is Tier 1 
are all omitted from the regressions as reference categories. + p<0.10, * 














We divide discussion of our results into three categories: major findings, 
implications for school finance litigation advocates and scholars, and 
implications for constitutional and legal theory more broadly. 
A. Major Findings 
Before we consider the statistically significant variables in our analysis, 
it is worth pointing out those factors that appear unrelated to judicial 
determinations in school finance cases. To start, our much more exhaustive 
analysis of cases confirms the insignificance of the law as reflected by the 
strength of a state’s constitutional text. Commentators have long suspected 
this to be the case,196 but it bears emphasis: the single factor one might 
naturally expect to be most predictive of school finance lawsuit outcomes—
the strength of the state’s constitutional guarantee regarding education—is 
not significantly related to actual decisions.197 
We also find an extremely limited relationship between lawsuit 
outcomes and another set of variables one might expect to carry weight: the 
specific “key facts” of each case. We do not find a significant relationship 
between state victories and reduced levels of spending inequity among 
districts within the state.198 We do find some evidence among cases 
involving liability determinations that states that spend more relative to the 
nation are more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from courts—though 
these results achieve only marginal significance and only in this subset of 
cases.199 Moreover, spending relative to the nation does not appear to make 
plaintiffs more likely to prevail at any particular level of court.200 Our 
analyses also lead us to reject several hypotheses about judicial behavior in 
school finance cases found by previous authors. For example, contrary to 
Lundberg, we find no support for the salience of a state’s “traditionalistic” 
values,201 nor do we find any evidence that the state’s demographic 
characteristics are associated with litigation outcomes.202  
Though our analysis leads us to reject these hypotheses, it does provide 
several new and important insights about the variables associated with 
 
196. See, e.g., supra note 7.  
197. See supra Tables 2–7. 
198. See supra Table 2. 
199. See supra Table 3. Thus, our findings offer tepid support of Swenson’s conclusion, based on 
forty state court decisions, that the odds of a state defendant victory rise as the state spends progressively 
greater amounts of money on education compared to other states. See Swenson, supra note 1, at 1176. 
200. See supra Tables 5–7. 
201. Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1146. 
202. See supra Tables 2–7. 












judicial decision-making in school finance litigation. Broadly speaking, 
these variables suggest economic, institutional, and political sensitivities. 
First, our results comport with the intuitive logic that, in cases with broad 
fiscal implications, rulings are associated with changes in the economy. 
Growth in the national economy is associated with an increased likelihood 
of plaintiffs prevailing203—a finding that held for the subset of liability 
cases.204 Though national economic growth was predictive of plaintiff 
victories, it is worth noting that there was a small countervailing tendency 
for growth in state GDP, but this association was smaller (half to a third the 
size), less consistently significant across our models, and not significant at 
all for the liability cases subset.205 It is also worth noting that these findings 
were driven almost entirely by the rulings of trial court judges and had no 
significant association with the rulings of intermediate courts or courts of 
last resort.206  
Second, our findings suggest that judicial decision-making is sensitive to 
the mode by which judges obtain office. Providing support for institutional 
theorists and in contrast to prior findings by Roch and Howard,207 we find 
evidence of a tendency of judges who face election to rule more often in 
favor of the state than do appointed judges.208 This tendency is particularly 
strong for judges who secured their position through an initial appointment 
and subsequently face reelection and is especially large in the context of 
liability cases. In liability cases, judges who are appointed and then elected 
are 36 percent more likely to rule in favor of the state than are judges who 
are simply appointed.209 Intriguingly, none of the models for trial courts or 
intermediate courts achieve significance on this finding but two of the 
models for the courts of last resort do achieve marginal significance.210 
While this court-level disparity is puzzling, our overall results provide some 
heft to the argument that institutional design might shape judicial decision-
making in important ways.  
Why might judges who face reelection pressures seem more inclined to 
rule for state defendants than appointed judges? We think the most plausible 
answer is rooted in the potential unpopularity of a pro-plaintiff ruling. After 
all, a ruling that the state’s existing school finance system violates the 
constitutional rights of children in disadvantaged school districts all but 
 
203. See supra Tables 2–5.  
204. See supra Table 3. 
205. See supra Tables 2–5. 
206. See supra Tables 5–7. 
207. See supra note 115. 
208. See supra Tables 2–3. 
209. See supra Table 3. 













requires one of two policy responses: increasing taxes to provide greater 
resources to poor districts, or leaving taxes stable but redistributing 
resources from wealthier to poor districts.211 Either approach would be 
unpopular with influential segments of the voting population, which may 
deter elected judges from finding for the plaintiffs in the first place.212 The 
same deterrent effect would logically apply to judges who are initially 
appointed but then face retention elections. The recall of three initially 
appointed California Supreme Court Justices in 1986 in response to their 
unpopular criminal justice rulings is just one example of this 
phenomenon.213  
Third, our results suggest that even when we account for the relationship 
between judicial decision-making and economic and judicial selection 
variables, there is an independent association with another key political 
variable—party control of the legislature. Judges deciding school finance 
cases are much more likely—21 percent—to find in favor of the state when 
the legislature is controlled by Democrats.214 And the association is nearly 
identical when the legislature is under split party control.215 Interestingly, 
when we examine decisions broken down by different levels of courts, we 
find that these results are driven by the decision of judges on courts of last 
resort.216 In such courts, Democratic control of the legislature is associated 
with a 30 percent increased likelihood of a judgment for the state.217   
These findings imply a judiciary that sees a distinct role for itself among 
the branches of government. Assuming that Democratic or split legislatures 
are more likely, though perhaps not optimally, sensitive to pleas for 
increased educational spending, the judiciary is likely to defer to these 
judgments about what constitutes adequate provision for public education. 
Presented with similar questions in the context of a Republican legislature, 
the judiciary is more likely to intervene by ruling in favor of plaintiffs. 
Given the general lack of significance of the variables corresponding to the 
state’s spending relative to the nation and the size of spending inequality 
among districts within the state, it would seem that the significance of party 
control over the legislature is a structural political consideration that 
 
211. See generally Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts 
from School Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 19 (2018). 
212. The experience of Ohio’s Supreme Court in the DeRolph litigation is a powerful testimony 
to this concern, as the unpopularity of the initial pro-plaintiff ruling eventually led the (elected) Court to 
terminate its jurisdiction in the matter. See Koski, supra note 6, at 1163–70. 
213. See Robert Lindsey, The Political Campaign: In California, Fierce Challenge to Judges, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at B8. 
214. See supra Table 2.  
215. See supra Table 2.  
216. See supra Table 7. 
217. See supra Table 7.   












influences decision-making. Judges, then, would appear to act less like 
activists than provocateurs—serving to raise questions of educational 
funding only when it is least likely to occur as part of the political process, 
and most likely doing so when the state can afford to ask these questions 
anew.   
Finally, our analysis also provides the first evidence for the significance 
of an additional institutional variable: court level. We hypothesized, and our 
results confirm, that judges serving on different levels of the court rule in 
ways that are differentially related to the variables we consider in our 
analysis. Our results would seem to suggest that there is a specific arc to 
school finance cases with different contextual factors being salient at 
different points in that trajectory. Economic factors appear most salient 
when school finance cases are resolved by trial court judges.218 Though our 
results are not causal, it is not hard to imagine how economic growth—
strongly associated with the strength of tax revenues—might factor into a 
trial court judge’s decision-making. After all, a trial court ruling calling for 
a drastic increase in state education spending at a time when the state is 
already facing fiscal pressure would seem an especially obvious candidate 
for the state to appeal—and thus a target for potential reversal by a higher 
court.219   
Yet by the time a case has found its way to the court of last resort, the 
salience of economic factors appears to give way to political factors.220 As 
suggested above, courts of last resort seem particularly concerned with how 
likely the legislature will be to address the state’s educational shortcomings 
without judicial intervention. When Democrats are in control, these high 
court judges appear much more likely to defer to the legislature. The 
heightened salience of such political considerations at the high court level 
makes sense because a decision by the high court is far more likely to 
necessitate a political response than a lower court ruling that is subject to 
multiple levels—and years—of the appeals process. Though we caution that 
the relatively small sample in each group leads us to weigh individual 
findings in this vein lightly, collectively we think they provide compelling 
evidence for decision-making variation by court level and a subject worthy 
of additional future investigation.  
 
218. See supra Table 5.  
219. Although it is only anecdotal, consider the timing of California’s decision to settle (rather 
than litigate) the Williams lawsuit in 2004, a choice that committed the state to nearly $1 billion in 
increased school spending. See Press Release, ACLU of S. Cal., ACLU and State of California Reach 
Settlement in Historic Williams Education Lawsuit (Aug. 13, 2004), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/news 
/aclu-and-state-california-reach-settlement-historic-williams-education-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/DM3 
N-XPAR]. National GDP increased by 6.6 percent in 2003. See supra note 184.  













B. Implications for the School Finance Community  
So what, if anything, can the school finance litigation community take 
from this quantitative analysis of judicial decision-making? There are 
obviously many factors that litigators consider when thinking about whether 
to bring a case—strength of the factual record, the weight of the precedent, 
or public sympathy with the plaintiffs’ experience—but our analysis 
suggests that savvy litigators might do well to add a few more elements to 
the scale when considering the timing of a school finance case.  
The first element is the general state of the economy. Our comprehensive 
analysis of case outcomes suggests that the state of the public coffers likely 
factors into whether a judge is willing to entertain overturning the state’s 
school finance scheme. This advice might seem counterintuitive—there is 
often an instinct to file lawsuits when school budgets are being cut as the 
result of shrinking tax revenues—but it makes sense. The fiscal implications 
of school finance cases are almost impossible to ignore. So to the extent that 
judges consider political factors at all, it is reasonable to believe that they 
take account of the one most directly implicated by their decisions. 
Importantly, we find that this association is robust to statistical controls for 
whether the decision is a liability ruling—removing the possibility that 
judges are all-in on plaintiffs’ claims in the abstract only to fold when real 
money is on the line.  
Our analysis further suggests that the association between fiscal health 
and school finance litigation outcomes is especially strong at the trial court 
level. Though litigators cannot control how long the litigation might last, 
they can certainly control when the case is filed. Bringing a case when the 
economy is strong and school budgets are possibly growing may feel 
counterintuitive, but again the evidence suggests that this counter-cyclical 
strategy may be the right approach. These considerations are strengthened 
further when one considers them alongside the growing body of evidence 
that the effects of school finance cases result not only in increased 
educational spending but also in reductions in spending disparities and 
increases in student achievement—findings that hold for both the equity and 
adequacy waves of school finance reform.221  
 
221. Advances in econometric techniques allow for causal, not just associational, interpretations 
of the effects of these court decisions. See generally, e.g., C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson & 
Claudia Persico, The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence 
from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J. ECON. 157 (2016) (examining the effects of school finance 
decisions on children born between 1955–85, generally corresponding with the equity wave); Julien 
Lafortune, Jesse Rothstein & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, School Finance Reform and the 
Distribution of Student Achievement, AM. ECON. J., Apr. 2018, at 1 (examining the effects of school 
 












Crucially, despite theoretical concerns that court rulings—perhaps 
reflecting their own, counter-majoritarian views of school resource 
distribution—would result either in only temporary increases in spending 
that reverted toward the mean voter preference over time, in spending 
equalization secured by “leveling-down,”222 or by overall reductions in 
social spending,223 this does not appear to be the case. Instead, in the first 
paper to examine how states pay for the increased equity achieved through 
court-ordered school finance reform, Professor Zachary Liscow provides 
convincing evidence that greater parity is achieved through redistributive 
means.224 Prior work had focused on overall changes in spending, leaving 
open the possibility that states were achieving equalization through 
regressive taxation—essentially making the beneficiaries pay for the 
changes through other means.225 Liscow, however, finds that this is not the 
case. States securing increased spending through redistributional taxation 
provides further evidence that successful school finance secures its intended 
outcomes and that these effects persist even decades later.226   
To reiterate, we are not suggesting that a growing economy ensures 
victory (or redistributional effects). But we are saying that it is a factor 
worth considering. Though we chose to examine the most publicly 
prominent measure of fiscal health—GDP—school finance litigators might 
take the more general point from the findings that allaying concerns about 
cost may be an important factor in judicial decision-making. To the extent 
that creative litigators can address those concerns, perhaps even in the 
absence of strong economic growth, that might be worth their while. 
In addition to providing evidence for the salience of economic factors in 
judicial decision-making, our analysis also provides insights into the way 
judges may view the institutional role of courts in school finance litigation. 
At its root, the literature on judicial decision-making grew out of a suspicion 
that judges were partisan political actors in black robes.227 Charges of 
“judicial activism” have fluctuated over time and generally been replaced 
 
finance decisions on student achievement from 1990–2011, generally corresponding with the adequacy 
wave); Liscow, supra note 211 (examining data on the effects of school finance decisions spanning both 
periods from 1972–2014).  
222. Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal, 116 Q.J. 
ECON. 1189, 1190 (2001). 
223. These concerns, at least, are not purely theoretical. See Katherine Baicker & Nora Gordon, 
The Effect of State Education Finance Reform on Total Local Resources, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1519, 1521 
(2006) (finding that school finance decisions were offset by decreases in other forms of social spending). 
224. Liscow, supra note 211.  
225. Baicker & Gordon, supra note 223 (finding a change in total state expenditures but not 
examining the progressive or regressive structure of state expenditures).   
226. Consistent with prior studies, Liscow finds a change in spending of $910 per student and that 
these changes persist for at least twenty-five years. Liscow, supra note 211, at 18. 













with more nuanced treatments of judges as political, perhaps, but only to a 
point.228 They are constrained by both institutional structure and 
considerations of institutional legitimacy.229 Our results offer additional 
nuance to this picture.  
Consistent with prior research, our analysis offers little support for the 
claim that judges are naked political partisans. Instead, our results paint a 
more complex picture that generally supports the idea of judges as strategic 
actors aware of their institutional setting and the broader political climate. 
In direct contrast to Howard and Roch, we find that elected judges are much 
more likely to rule in favor of the state than are appointed judges.230 This is 
true both for judges who are elected and those who are initially appointed 
and subsequently affirmed by election.231 Our results also provide 
suggestive evidence that the sensitivities of judges who are appointed and 
elected are particularly acute for those on the court of last resort, perhaps 
because their elections can become partisan rallying cries—the judicial 
career of California Supreme Court Justice Cruz Reynoso provides a real-
life example of this dynamic.232 That these sensitivities are driven by 
financial considerations would seem to be underscored by our additional 
finding that these tendencies are only statistically significant for rulings in 
liability cases233—a finding that also comports well with the salience of 
economic strength discussed above.  
Though judges appeared sensitive to their institutional position and job 
security, they also appeared to be sensitive to the political climate in a way 
that, again, seems characterized more by restraint than activism. If the 
invalidation of state school finance systems was truly driven by the partisan 
preferences of activist liberal judges, then these judges seem to have 
consistently missed the optimal political window to redesign state finance 
systems via friendly, Democrat-held legislatures. Not only were judges not 
more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs when the legislature was controlled 
by Democrats, they were actually more likely to rule against plaintiffs and 
in favor of the state by a statistically significant margin. And this tendency 
was driven almost entirely by the actions of state high courts. While lawyers 
 
228. See supra Part I.A. 
229. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  
230. See supra Table 2.  
231. See supra Table 2. Intriguingly, the tendency to rule in favor of the state is stronger for judges 
who are initially appointed and face election than those who are elected straight away. This would be 
consistent with the possibility that elected judges, while still sensitive to the political climate and more 
reluctant than appointed judges to create new state liabilities, feel a stronger popular mandate than do 
judges who were appointed and have no such initial claim of popular support. 
232. See supra note 213. 
233. Compare supra Table 3 (describing findings for liability cases), with supra Table 4 
(describing findings for non-liability cases).  












challenging a school finance system might think they need to wait until 
Democrats hold a legislature and strategically time their lawsuit in order to 
provide the legislature with some political “cover” to justify the always 
difficult task of raising taxes, our results suggest such timing considerations 
are unlikely to increase the likelihood of success and may actually do the 
opposite. State high court justices in particular would seem to view 
themselves as neither judicial activists nor legal dogmatists but rather as 
inter-governmental interrogators—something school finance litigators 
might do well to remember.234 
Michael Rebell has long argued that, as a normative matter, judges in 
school finance cases should approach their work as engaging in a 
“colloquy” with the executive and legislative branches.235 Our results 
suggest that this has been occurring not just anecdotally236 but 
systematically across the long history of school finance litigation. Indeed, 
far from pursuing their own activist agendas, acting on their own 
“whimsy,”237 or usurping responsibility from state legislatures, judges 
appear to be reluctant participants in school finance matters. Democratic 
legislatures, presumably making good faith efforts to address school 
inequities within the prevailing political climate, were unlikely to see their 
work disrupted by judges. In contrast, Republican-held legislatures sitting 
with strong economic winds at their backs were much more likely to be 
called to account by judges inquiring about inequities in educational 
spending.  
That this tendency is driven by state supreme courts is reassuring to those 
who recognize that giving substance to the educational rights of children is 
difficult, uncertain work that needs to be approached with circumspection. 
As Rebell and others have argued, courts have considerable institutional 
 
234. Though Ely barely mentions education rights—let alone school finance litigation—in his 
seminal work on judicial review, many education law scholars have seen parallels between his work and 
the proper role of courts in educational rights cases. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: 
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (stressing the importance of both majority governance and 
minority rights); REBELL, supra note 22, at 51; Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Solving 
“Problems No One Has Solved”: Courts, Causal Inference, and the Right to Education, 2018 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 693, 709–10; Koski, supra note 6, at 1097–98; William E. Thro, A New Approach to State 
Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 526 n.5 (1998).  
235. REBELL, supra note 22, at 6, 56–84. On the colloquy between the judiciary and other branches 
more broadly, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? 
Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991). 
236. Rebell highlights the school finance litigation experiences of Vermont, Kentucky, and 
Massachusetts. REBELL, supra note 22, at 5. 
237. It is worth stressing that unlike Swenson, we find judges in school finance cases behaving in 













capacities to frame key public policy questions,238 assemble facts,239 weigh 
social science evidence,240 and correct political failures in the efficient and 
equitable allocation of resources.241 These results suggest that judges are 
using these capacities judiciously—deferring to legislatures whenever 
possible but not afraid to act as a venue of last resort for inquiring after the 
rights of children in low-income districts.     
C. Implications for Legal Theory 
Our findings also shed light on a pair of important debates in 
constitutional law, one involving the interaction between constitutional 
rights and remedies and the other regarding methods of constitutional 
interpretation.     
1. The Rights Essentialism – Remedial Equilibration Debate 
State court adjudication of school finance lawsuits lends support to what 
Professor Richard Fallon has called the “constitutional pragmatist” school 
of thought.242 This school holds that it is not “useful or even meaningful to 
 
238. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 668–70 (1993).  
239. In the context of educational policy where basic information about schools is often difficult 
to obtain, this may be a particularly and uniquely important role for courts. See Elmendorf & Shanske, 
supra note 234, at 705–12. 
240. There is considerable disagreement on courts’ particular interest and competency in this 
regard. Compare MARK A. CHESLER, JOSEPH SANDERS & DEBRA S. KALMUSS, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
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Edmond, Supersizing Daubert Science for Litigation and Its Implications for Legal Practice and 
Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REV. 857 (2007), and James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social 
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talk about” how courts determine rights without also talking about how 
those rights are enforced via particular remedies.243   
The leading proponent of the pragmatist camp is Professor Daryl 
Levinson, who, in a 1999 article, took aim at a then-prevailing view of 
constitutional law.244 Under that earlier view, which Professor Levinson 
dubbed “rights essentialism,” constitutional rights “emerge fully formed 
from abstract interpretation of constitutional text, structure, and history,” 
uncorrupted by the policy tradeoffs and practical considerations that drive 
decisions regarding remedies.245 This rights essentialist view is exemplified 
by Professor Lawrence Sager’s contention that “there is an important 
distinction between a statement which describes an ideal which is embodied 
in the Constitution and a statement which attempts to translate such an ideal 
into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues.”246 Rights 
essentialism is thus the view that constitutional “rights can be talked about 
and understood—indeed, can be best understood—in complete isolation 
from (merely) remedial concerns.”247 
Levinson argues that the more accurate picture is a phenomenon he 
labels “remedial equilibration.” Under this model of judicial decision-
making, rights and remedies are not “hermetically sealed”;248 instead 
“constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial 
concerns.”249 One critical pathway through which this interaction operates 
is that judges will be sensitive to the costs of “undesirable remedial 
consequences” in the course of defining constitutional rights.250 “At the 
extreme,” for instance, Levinson posits that “where no viable remedy is at 
hand, courts may define [a] right as nonexistent.”251 
Levinson offers a rich set of cases that are consistent with, and provide 
support for, the remedial equilibration thesis.252 What he lacks, however, is 
a way of showing remedial equilibration empirically. For as Levinson 
concedes, “claiming that a right would be different if a different remedy 
followed entails a counterfactual claim that is ordinarily highly speculative: 
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that the right would have been A rather than B if the remedy had been X 
rather than Y.”253 Put another way, to prove remedial equilibration in 
practice, Levinson would need a method for comparing real-life outcomes 
in cases where judges face difficult remedial considerations (such as the 
high cost of enforcing a given right) against similarly situated cases where 
“the relevant remedial concerns [do] not exist.”254 Yet situations where 
remedial concerns magically disappear would seem to be unobservable. 
Enter our school finance litigation data set. Scholars have often observed 
that pro-plaintiff rulings, which entail judicial imposition of potentially 
massive liability orders against the state (in addition to prolonged court 
involvement), raise the specter of what Levinson would call “undesirable 
remedial consequences.”255 Yet unlike most of Levinson’s examples, which 
involve the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of particular constitutional 
issues (and thus a small sample of cases), state-level school finance 
decisions are robust in number, spanning time and a range of economic 
conditions. The result is something of a natural experiment. A significant 
number of state court rulings are issued when remedial concerns are at their 
peak—that is, when the economy is performing poorly and state budgets are 
strained. Yet others are issued when the economy is healthy and state coffers 
are comparatively flush with cash, such that judicial concern with the 
legislature’s ability to afford a remedy is largely mitigated. If Levinson is 
right, we would expect to see judges behave more sympathetically to school 
finance plaintiffs when the economy is strong and remedial concerns 
dissipate. 
The data bear out Levinson’s thesis. Judges are more likely to rule for 
school finance plaintiffs when strong economic conditions reduce the 
remedial deterrent effect of a liability order. This finding undermines rights 
essentialism: if rights really were on a higher plane, determined as a 
“Platonic ideal” logically prior to any concern for remedies,256 one would 
think the state’s ability to make good on a liability ruling would have no 
impact on what judges think a state constitution requires. That judges are 
significantly less likely to find a violation of the right to education when the 
economy is faltering suggests the opposite: “Constitutional adjudication is 
functional not just at the level of remedies, but all the way up.”257   
 
253. Id. at 890. 
254. See id. at 900. 
255. Id. at 885; see, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 915, 938–42 (2016) (recognizing that when courts are “disinclined to enjoin their legislatures to 
perform—i.e., in most cases, to increase school funding,” that is an example of Levinson’s remedial 
equilibration in action). 
256. See Levinson, supra note 39, at 873. 
257. Id. 












Indeed, the finding that elected judges are especially likely to rule in 
favor of the state suggests that functional considerations operate at the 
personal level for judges, too. From this perspective, a judge will be 
especially likely to uphold a state’s school funding system when (1) 
economic conditions make a costly remedial order unbearable for the state 
budget (i.e., such an order would command the legislature to raise taxes 
precisely when the state’s residents are struggling the most), and (2) the 
judge could lose her job by ruling for the plaintiffs anyways. 
A similar functionalist lesson can be gleaned from our finding regarding 
party control over the legislature, albeit through a different mechanism. 
Judicial sensitivity to economic conditions shows how courts may respond 
to increasingly negative remedial consequences by paring back a 
constitutional right—even (as in some school finance cases) to the point of 
defining the right as nonexistent.258 Variance in the cost of pro-plaintiff 
rulings, in other words, can shape judicial behavior. But what happens when 
state courts are faced with changing degrees of costs that would result from 
a pro-defendant ruling? Might remedial equilibration also include judicial 
sensitivity to the remedial outcome of judicial inaction, too? 
Such a dynamic may be hard to imagine, but the school finance litigation 
data set points up the possibility that courts may think of judicially-imposed 
remedies as more or less necessary depending on the likelihood of a self-
driven legislative solution. On this view, it is not just the undesirable 
consequences of court-ordered relief that can drive judges to narrow the 
scope of constitutional rights; it is also the possibility of desirable legislative 
progress in the absence of court-ordered relief. That is precisely the 
implication of our finding that courts are more likely to rule for state 
defendants when Democrats control the legislature: because the legislature 
is in that scenario more likely to increase school funding under its own 
volition, the reduced necessity of a judicial remedy leads to a narrower 
conception of the relevant constitutional right. Conversely, when a 
legislatively-initiated fix is less likely (i.e., when Republicans control the 
legislature), the harm of judicial inaction is greater, leaving courts more 
willing to recognize a robust right to education under the state 
constitution.259 
 
258. See id. at 885; Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (“[W]e conclude that the 
Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to 
achieve any particular standard of resulting educational quality.”). 













2. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation 
Our results also speak to the enduring debate over constitutional 
interpretation. The entry point into this debate is a recent move among 
prominent constitutional theorists away from normative arguments about 
constitutional interpretive theory and toward positivist ones. Professor 
William Baude has described this as the “positive turn,” or the argument 
that “certain present social facts” that are “embodied in our legal practice” 
should determine our approach to constitutional interpretation rather than 
“moral considerations.”260 Arguments between originalism and non-
originalism, in other words, should focus less on what is good or just, and 
more on what judges actually do. And under that approach, Baude contends 
that a kind of “inclusive originalism”—a theory that permits judges to 
consult policy concerns and precedent so long as the original meaning of 
the Constitution does not forbid it—really is the law in view of our general 
legal practices, including most prominently “how the Supreme Court 
publicly reasons about constitutional law.”261 
Professor Baude’s claim is principally one of federal constitutional 
interpretation; he recognizes that determining the socially-grounded method 
of constitutional interpretation in the states would depend on “each state’s 
political and legal culture.”262 But it is also the case that state judicial 
practices may inform one’s sense of what constitutes our shared legal 
practice with respect to constitutional interpretation more broadly, including 
at the federal level.263 After all, one might be skeptical of the claim that 
inclusive originalism (or any version) truly is a shared national legal 
commitment if it turned out that state courts routinely engage in non-
originalist constitutional interpretation. Conversely, if every state court 
judge were a faithful originalist, it would make claims to the contrary at the 
federal level harder to substantiate. 
A recent article by Jeremy Christiansen makes a forceful case that some 
version of originalism is indeed grounded in state judicial practice. After 
 
260. Baude, supra note 34, at 2351 & n.5; see also Sachs, supra note 34. 
261. Baude, supra note 34, at 2355–61, 2365–86. 
262. Id. at 2400. 
263. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 758–59 (2006) (arguing that state court 
understandings of federal constitutional law could satisfy the rule of recognition and thus ground the 
law among a particular community); Christopher Kutz, The Judicial Community, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 442, 
448 (2001) (arguing that “it is dangerous to generalize from the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . 
to make a point about U.S. legal practice. . . . The bulk of law-determining goes on in the trial courts 
and courts of appeals, state and federal, where it is more plausible to assume that judicial determinations 
are made largely by reference to legal criteria whose force stems from their conventional acceptance” 
(emphasis added)); cf. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 323, 347–48 (2011) (arguing that state constitutions may be a “good measure of public values”). 












examining an exhaustive set of state court decisions from the founding, 
Christiansen supplies solid evidence that thirty-eight states subscribe to 
originalism as a “primary canon of state constitutional interpretation.”264 
“[I]f we are going to make empirical assertions about originalism,” 
Christiansen suggests, we ought to “account[] for th[is] full body of law.”265 
Saying that thirty-eight states invoke originalist language in describing 
their approaches to constitutional interpretation is, however, a little bit like 
saying that most human beings describe themselves as religious. It’s true, 
but it doesn’t tell us all that much given the great deal of heterogeneity 
within the overarching label.266 And to his credit, Christiansen 
acknowledges that his research isn’t able to answer what kind of originalists 
state courts are, if they be that.267   
Yet the question of what kind of originalist a court purports to be is 
arguably just as important as whether a court claims the mantle of 
originalism at all.268 On one side of the broader originalist camp are the 
“new originalists,” eminent scholars like Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, 
Lawrence Solum, and Keith Whittington, who believe that although the 
original public meaning of the Constitution is fixed in time and constrains 
judicial actors, it does not determine the outcome of all (or perhaps even 
many269) disputes.270 To these new originalists, when the original public 
meaning runs out, courts enter into a “construction zone” in which 
normative arguments must be made to decide each case.271 Baude’s 
“inclusive originalism” is certainly of a piece with this approach.272   
 
264. Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary Canon of State Constitutional 
Interpretation, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 344, 357 (2017). 
265. Id. at 366.  
266. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 718 
(2011) (“‘[O]riginalism’ is a label that has been, and continues to be, affixed to a remarkably diverse 
array of interpretive theories that in fact share surprisingly little in common.”); James E. Fleming, Are 
We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 1787–88 (2013) (noting how under an 
inclusive formulation, “originalism clearly is a big tent,” but that such a view “may obscure our 
differences more than elucidate common ground”). 
267. See Christiansen, supra note 264, at 364–65 (acknowledging that his list of originalist 
references “intermingl[es] . . . original-intent originalism and original-public meaning originalism,” one 
of the important distinctions in the originalist camp). 
268. The discussion of different approaches to originalism that follows is necessarily abbreviated 
and glosses over several important nuances. For a more detailed discussion of some of these differences, 
see Colby, supra note 266, at 716–36; Solum, supra note 38, at 458–69. 
269. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
270. See Solum, supra note 38; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
271. See Solum, supra note 38, at 472. 













On another side of the camp are older-school originalists who often focus 
on the original intentions or expected applications of the framers273 and who 
believe originalist sources of meaning should decide all constitutional cases, 
precluding judges from reliance on consequentialist concerns or policy 
preferences.274 As Judge Robert Bork once described this approach, “[t]he 
only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges 
interpret the document’s words according to the intentions of those who 
drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions.”275   
The space between the new and old originalist camps is large and critical: 
it is the difference between referring to a case like Obergefell v. Hodges as 
comfortably originalist276—and not.277 So which kind of originalists are the 
state courts? Christiansen’s data doesn’t answer this, and indeed the rule 
statements he pulls from state court opinions point in competing directions. 
Several state courts seem to claim a kind of older originalism, one in which 
judges are to “look only to the intent of the drafters, the delegates, and the 
voters in adopting the [State’s] Constitution.”278 That kind of stringent 
approach would, if taken seriously, rule out judicial reliance on post-
enactment historical practice, precedent, and prudential policy concerns—
 
273. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
274. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (“We 
find no support for constitutional construction . . . at the time of the Framing. . . . Rather, the evidence 
suggests that ambiguity and vagueness were resolved by considering evidence of history, structure, 
purpose, and intent.”). 
275. Judge Robert H. Bork, Speech by Judge Robert H. Bork at the University of San Diego Law 
School (Nov. 18, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 43, 45 
(1986). 
276. See Baude, supra note 34, at 2382; William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism's Bite, 
20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 104–05 (2016). 
277. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one 
woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases.”). 
278. People v. Fitzpatrick, 986 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (Ill. 2013); see also, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 
268 P.3d 822, 824 (Utah 2011) (“In interpreting our constitution, our goal is to ascertain the drafters’ 
intent.”); Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 764 (Conn. 1995) (“[I]n determining whether unenumerated 
rights were incorporated into the constitution, we must focus on the framers’ understanding of whether 
a particular right was part of the natural law, i.e., on the framers’ understanding of whether the particular 
right was so fundamental to an ordered society that it did not require explicit enumeration. We can 
discern the framers’ understanding, of course, only by examining the historical sources.”); Dawson v. 
Tobin, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (N.D. 1946) (“The sole object sought in construing a constitutional provision 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the framers and of the people who adopted 
it . . . .”); Ansel v. Means, 172 S.E. 434, 436 (S.C. 1934) (“It is the fundamental principle of all rules 
governing the construction of written instruments that the intent of the makers of the instrument shall be 
ascertained and shall control.”). 












including the economic and political consequences of different 
constitutional remedies.   
On the other hand, some state courts appear to invoke the newer brand 
of originalism, where original public meaning is what matters and where 
ambiguities may be resolved by pluralist sources of normative argument. 
For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court has explained that where “the 
language of the constitution [is] plain and unambiguous, and thus the intent 
of the framers’ and of those who adopted the constitution is clear, we need 
not employ principles of construction to ascertain the constitution's intended 
meaning.”279 The implication, of course, is that constitutional construction 
is permissible in other cases where the constitutional text is ambiguous. 
Our data suggest that one and only one of these versions of originalism 
can make a plausible claim to being our law. To the extent state 
constitutional challenges to school funding systems are determined by 
factors that cannot be described as the original meaning of the relevant text 
(or the intentions of its enactors), state judges are not behaving as 
“originalists” in the older-school sense. It goes without saying that 
consequentialist concerns such as then-prevailing economic conditions and 
party control over the state legislature are a far cry from a historical 
examination into the meaning of state education clauses at the time when 
they were enacted. 
By contrast, state courts could be acting consistently with new 
originalism. A new originalist approach to deciding school finance cases is 
actually quite an easy story to tell: the underlying constitutional text is 
hopelessly vague (what, exactly, is the duty to provide for a “uniform[] and 
general”280 or “thorough and efficient”281 system of public schools?), so 
courts must decide concrete cases using ordinary tools of constitutional 
construction.282 And one such tool includes prudential considerations such 
as the feasibility of a court-imposed remedy.283   
 
279. Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 2000); see also, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. City 
of Birmingham, 79 So. 489, 492 (Ala. 1918) (noting that although the “intent [of the framers] is to be 
found in the instrument itself,” it may be permissible to “search for [a provision’s] meaning beyond the 
instrument” in cases where the text is “ambiguous” (quoting Lake Cty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 
(1889))); State v. Grey, 32 P. 190, 192 (Nev. 1893) (“[W]here the words of a constitution are 
unambiguous, and, in their commonly received sense, lead to a reasonable conclusion, then such 
instrument should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of its framers, without 
resorting to subtle and forced construction . . . .”). 
280. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
281. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
282. See Solum, supra note 38, at 469–71 (explaining why vague constitutional questions fall 
within the construction zone). 
283. Id. at 481–82 (explaining how an originalist constitutional pluralist would be free to rely on 













But does our data support the conclusion that this is the actual story 
unfolding in state courts? That is much harder to say. To genuinely inform 
that question, we would need to code each opinion in our data set for 
whether it makes “originalist arguments” before arriving at a particular 
result.284 As an anecdotal matter, some courts certainly do: Kentucky’s 
Supreme Court, for instance, declared in the course of invalidating the 
state’s school finance system that “[w]e do not direct the members of the 
General Assembly to raise taxes. . . . We only determine the intent of the 
framers.”285 Indiana’s Supreme Court engaged in a historical analysis of the 
enactment of its operative 1851 education clause in concluding the 
opposite.286   
Yet other state court rulings are devoid of originalist reasoning 
altogether. South Carolina’s Supreme Court, for example, recognized a state 
constitutional right to a “minimally adequate education” without an iota of 
discussion regarding the original meaning of the relevant constitutional text 
or the intent of its framers.287 If other state courts engage in similar modes 
of analysis, that would seem to us evidence of a shared practice of non-
originalism in constitutional interpretation. For this reason, further inquiry 
into how state courts actually go about deciding constitutional challenges to 
school funding systems may offer useful insights into the positivist question 
of what our law of constitutional interpretation really is.288 What we can say 
with some certainty now is that an older brand of exclusive originalism—
one that forbids courts to consider factors outside of the original meaning 
of the text (or the intent of its framers)—is inconsistent with how judges are 
deciding this important realm of state constitutional cases.289 
 
284. Whether those arguments are correct or not, as a matter of originalism, is not the point; what 
matters is whether the state courts see themselves as required to apply originalism as a methodology. 
See Baude & Sachs, supra note 276, at 104. 
285. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
286. See Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (“Guided as we are 
by the text of the constitutional provision in the context of its history, we conclude that the Education 
Clause of the Indiana Constitution does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any 
particular standard of resulting educational quality.”). 
287. See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 539–40 (S.C. 1999). 
288. For an argument that originalism may offer a useful mode of argument in school finance 
cases (but without concluding that it actually is a prevailing mode of judicial decision-making), see R. 
Craig Wood & William E. Thro, Originalism and the State Education Clauses: The Louisiana Voucher 
Case as an Illustration, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 875 (2014). 
289. In this sense, our findings offer some empirical grounding for Professor Baude’s belief that 
“[i]t is probably right that there is no way a positivist could” call exclusive originalism our law. Baude, 
supra note 34, at 2355–56. 













To some, the finding that economic and political considerations 
influence how judges determine the nature of state constitutional education 
rights may possess something of a self-evident quality.290 Of course judges 
look beyond the law, and of course they do so most in circumstances like 
this, where the text of the relevant constitutional provisions is so vague and 
the consequences of each case are so great.   
Before now, however, the belief that the law and key case facts do not 
alone decide the outcome of educational rights litigation has largely been 
that—a belief (grounded, as most beliefs are, in intuition and experience). 
Scholarly efforts to show this empirically have struggled with statistical 
power and methodological design flaws.   
Our objective has thus been two-fold. First, we have endeavored to 
produce a large, high-quality dataset that can be utilized both in our project 
as well as future efforts to examine school funding lawsuit outcomes. In that 
sense, the final payoff of this effort is still to be determined, as we eagerly 
await the opportunity to share our data with others in the field. Second, we 
have tried to offer an initial analysis of our dataset along with some 
discussion of key takeaways. On this front we believe the payoff is more 
immediate. Judges, we have found, do not look only (or even significantly) 
to the law and key case facts when deciding school finance lawsuits. They 
instead train their eyes externally, to the economic and political 
consequences of their decisions. Whether that should be a source of comfort 
or dismay is of course a major question—one that will depend ultimately on 


















Full List of Decisions in Data Set 
State Case Name 
Decision 
Year Citation Court Level 
AK Kasayulie v. State 1999 [Unreported] Trial Court 
AK Moore v. Alaska 2007 2007 WL 
8310251 
Trial court 
AL Alabama Coalition for 
Equity, Inc. v. Hunt 
1993 1993 WL 
204083 
Trial Court 
AL Ex Parte James 1997 713 So.2d 
869 
Court of last 
resort 
AL Ex Parte James II 2002 836 So.2d 
813 
Court of last 
resort 
AL James v. Alabama 
Coalition for Equity, Inc. 
1997 713 So.2d 
937 
Court of last 
resort 
AL Opinion of the Justices 1993 624 So.2d 
107 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Deer/Mt. Judea School 
District v. Beebe 
2011 2011 WL 
9683713 
Trial court 
AR Deer/Mt. Judea School 
District v. Beebe 
2012 2012 WL 
665604 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Deer/Mt. Judea School 
District v. Kimbrell 
2013 430 S.W.3d 
29 
Court of last 
resort 
AR DuPree v. Alma School 
District No. 30 of 
Crawford County 
1983 651 S.W.2d 
90 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee I 
1998 [Unreported] Trial court 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee I 
2000 10 S.W.3d 
892 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee II 
2002 91 S.W.3d 
472 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
2001 [Unreported] Trial court 












Phillips County v. 
Huckabee II 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee III 
2005 210 S.W.3d 
28 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee III 
2005 220 S.W.3d 
645 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee III 
2004 189 S.W.3d 1 Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee IV 
2007 257 S.W.3d 
879 
Court of last 
resort 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 v. Jim 
Guy Tucker 
1994 1994 WL 
16477432 
Trial court 
AR Lake View School 
District No. 25 v. Tucker 
1994 [Unreported] Trial court 
AR Tucker v. Lake View 
School District No. 25 of 
Phillips County 
1996 917 S.W.2d 
530 
Court of last 
resort 
AZ Cave Creek Unified 
School District v. Martin 
2011 2011 WL 
12711078 
Trial court 
AZ Cave Creek Unified 
School District v. Ducey 
2013 295 P.3d 440 Intermediate 
court 
AZ Cave Creek Unified 
School District v. Ducey 
2013 308 P.3d 
1152 
Court of last 
resort 
AZ Cave Creek Unified 
School District v. Martin 




AZ Craven v. Huppenthal 2013 [Unreported] Trial court 
AZ Craven v. Huppenthal 2014 338 P.3d 324 Intermediate 
court 
AZ Hull v. Albrecht 1996 [Unreported] Trial court 
AZ Hull v. Albrecht 1997 [Unreported] Court of last 
resort 













AZ Hull v. Albrecht 1997 950 P.2d 
1141 
Court of last 
resort 
AZ Hull v. Albrecht 1998 960 P.2d 634 Court of last 
resort 
AZ Roosevelt Elementary 
School Dist. No. 66 v. 
Bishop 
1992 [Unreported] Trial court 
AZ Roosevelt Elementary 
School Dist. No. 66 v. 
Bishop 
1994 877 P.2d 806 Court of last 
resort 
AZ Roosevelt Elementary 
School Dist. No. 66 v. 
State 
2002 [Unreported] Trial court 
AZ Roosevelt Elementary 
School Dist. No. 66 v. 
State 
2003 74 P.3d 258 Intermediate 
court 
CA Serrano v. Priest 1970 




CA Serrano v. Priest I 1971 
487 P.2d 
1241 
Court of last 
resort 
CA Serrano v. Priest 1974 [Unreported] Trial court 
CA Serrano v. Priest II 1976 557 P.2d 929 
Court of last 
resort 
CA Serrano v. Priest 1977 
569 P.2d 
1303 
Court of last 
resort 






Robles-Wong v. State of 
California 2011 
2011 WL 
3322890 Trial court 
CA 
Campaign for Quality 
Education v. State of 
California 2016 
209 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 888 
Intermediate 
court 
CO Dwyer v. State of 
Colorado 
2014 [Unreported] Trial court 
CO Dwyer v. State of 
Colorado 
2015 357 P.3d 185 Court of last 
resort 
CO Lobato v. State 2006 2006 WL 
4037485 
Trial court 
CO Lobato v. State 2008 216 P.3d 29 Intermediate 
court 
CO Lobato v. State 2009 218 P.3d 358 Court of last 
resort 












CO Lobato v. State 2011 2011 WL 
10960207 
Trial court 
CO Lobato v. State 2013 304 P.3d 
1132 
Court of last 
resort 
CO Lujan v. Colorado State 
Board of Education 
1979 [Unreported] Trial court 
CO Lujan v. Colorado State 
Board of Education 
1982 649 P.2d 
1005 
Court of last 
resort 
CT Carroll-Hall v. Rell 2007 2007 WL 
2938295 
Trial court 
CT Connecticut Coalition 
for Justice in Education 
Funding, Inc. (CCJEF) 
v. Rell 
2010 990 A.2d 206 Court of last 
resort 
CT Connecticut Coalition 
for Justice in Education 
Funding, Inc. (CCJEF) 
v. Rell 
2016 [Unreported] Trial court 
CT Horton v. Meskill 1974 332 A.2d 113 Trial court 
CT Horton v. Meskill 1977 376 A.2d 359 Court of last 
resort 
FL Citizens for Strong 
Schools, Inc. v. Florida 
State Board of Education 
2010 2010 WL 
8747791 
Trial court 
FL Haridopolos v. Citizens 
for Strong Schools, Inc. 
2011 81 So.3d 465 Intermediate 
court 
FL Citizens for Strong 
Schools, Inc. v. Florida 
State Board of Education 




FL Coalition for Adequacy 
and Fairness in School 
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles 
1995 [Unreported] Trial court 
FL Coalition for Adequacy 
and Fairness in School 
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles 
1996 680 So.2d 
400 
Court of last 
resort 
GA Consortium for Adequate 
School Funding in 
Georgia (CASFG) v. 
State 













GA Consortium for Adequate 
School Funding in 
Georgia (CASFG) v. 
State 
2008 2008 WL 
8238595 
Trial court 
GA McDaniel v. Thomas 1980 [Unreported] Trial court 
GA McDaniel v. Thomas 1981 285 S.E.2d 
156 
Court of last 
resort 
ID Idaho Schools for Equal 
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